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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.11119

Scalable Neural Safety Certification via Monotonicity

Amirreza Alavi, Majid Zamani, Saber Jafarpour

原文摘要

Learning-based safety certification offers a promising route for verifying complex dynamical systems when explicit models are unavailable, but existing data-driven methods often scale poorly: they treat the system as a black box, rely on dense discretizations or Lipschitz bounds, and consequently suffer from sample complexity that grows exponentially with dimension. This paper shows that a common structural property of dynamical systems--monotonicity--can be used to break this curse of dimensionality. We develop a data-driven framework for robust safety verification and safe controller synthesis for unknown monotone systems using only simulator queries. Our main theoretical result proves that, for monotone systems with upper-closed unsafe sets, safety is completely characterized by the existence of monotone inductive barrier certificates. This structure reduces certificate verification over continuous state spaces to localized boundary checks over finitely many cells. To learn such certificates, we introduce Max-Monotone Networks, a monotone neural architecture with universal approximation guarantees for monotone functions. We then propose a training and refinement algorithm that, upon successful termination, returns formally valid neural barrier certificates and, under mild partition assumptions, requires only $O(n)$ simulator queries. Across high-dimensional benchmarks, including oscillator networks with up to $13{,}659$ states and traffic networks with $1{,}000$ states, our method certifies safety in regimes where prior approaches either do not converge or exceed memory limits. These results demonstrate that exploiting order structure can make neural safety certification both scalable and formally sound.

eess.SY · cs.LG · math.OC

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.38127

A Separation Principle for Adversarial Attacks and Defense of Graph Neural Networks

Farid Mafi, Saber Jafarpour, Mohammad Pirani

原文摘要

Adversarial attacks on graph neural networks (GNNs) have been studied as a model-centric optimization problem driven by gradients, learned policies, or meta-learning, with the graph treated as a passive substrate. This view overlooks a defining feature of GNNs: their predictions are produced by structured message passing along the graph, so their adversarial vulnerabilities are encoded as much in the geometry of the graph as in the learned weights. We develop a structure-driven framework for feature attacks in which the attack is derived from the spectral properties of the normalized adjacency operator. Its central result is a separation principle: under a natural relaxation of the attack objective, the optimal feature perturbation is rank one and factorizes into a graph-dependent component (degree-proportional spatial allocation, depending only on the graph) and a weight-dependent component (top singular vector of the composed weights, depending only on the weights). Node degree thus emerges as the fundamental graph quantity governing adversarial vulnerability to feature perturbations. The resulting attack, which we call SepAttack, requires no gradient computation, carries analytical guarantees, achieves competitive or superior performance against established baselines such as Nettack and IG-Attack with up to ${\sim}70\times$ speedup in the targeted setting, and transfers near-perfectly across architectures on continuous-feature graphs because its graph-dependent component is architecture-invariant by construction. We further derive a separation-principle adversarial training procedure (SepAT) directly from the closed-form worst-case attack and report robustness gains on binary-feature benchmarks.

cs.LG