MM-PoisonRAG: Disrupting Multimodal RAG with Local and Global Knowledge Poisoning Attacks
Hyeonjeong Ha Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Qiusi Zhan, Jeonghwan Kim, Dimitrios Bralios, Saikrishna Sanniboina Microsoft, Nanyun Peng Google and University of California, Los Angeles, Kai-Wei Chang University of California, Los Angeles and Amazon, Daniel Kang 等 9 位作者
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has become a common practice in multimodal large language models (MLLM) to enhance factual grounding and reduce hallucination. Yet, its reliance on retrieval exposes MLLMs to knowledge poisoning attacks, in which adversaries deliberately inject malicious multimodal content into external knowledge bases to steer models toward generating incorrect or even harmful responses. We present MM-PoisonRAG, a framework to systematically study the vulnerability of multimodal RAG under knowledge poisoning. Specifically, we design two novel attack strategies: Localized Poisoning Attack (LPA), which implants targeted, query-specific multimodal misinformation to manipulate outputs toward attacker-controlled responses, and Globalized Poisoning Attack (GPA), which uses a single, untargeted adversarial injection to broadly corrupt reasoning and collapse generation quality across all queries. Extensive experiments on diverse tasks, multimodal RAG components, and attacker access levels reveal severe vulnerabilities: LPA achieves up to 56% attack success rate even under restricted access, and transfers effectively across four different retrievers without re-optimizing the adversaries. GPA completely disrupts model generation to 0% accuracy with just one poisoned content. Moreover, both LPA and GPA bypass existing defenses, underscoring the fragility of multimodal RAG and establishing MM-PoisonRAG as a foundation for future research on securing RAG frameworks against multimodal knowledge poisoning.
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Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表