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原文摘要

Advances in monocular depth estimation (MDE) now let an attacker generate depth from publicly available RGB images and submit forged RGB-D queries. Such attacks break a core assumption of RGB-D place authentication: that depth comes from a sensor. We study a presentation attack detection (PAD) classifier that uses geometric consistency between the enrollment and query views, as a software-layer defense. A three-stage evaluation shows how far this classifier detects software-injected depth, depending on how accurately the attacker knows the camera intrinsics. In the first stage, the attacker has only an estimate of the intrinsics, and the PAD classifier separates forgeries generated by all three MDE models with a validation area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) of 0.997-0.999. In the second stage, the attacker obtains the exact intrinsics, and the original PAD classifier falls to near chance (AUC 0.54-0.61); a retrained PAD classifier, however, still has the registration residual between enrollment and query as a cue. In the third stage, an oracle evaluation, in which the evaluator fits warps using the ground-truth 3D geometry, shows that detection falls to near chance only in its strongest case, where every valid query keypoint is given its ground-truth 3D coordinate. Of the detection cues, the reprojection error captures the attacker's misestimate of the intrinsics, whereas the registration residual remains even when the attacker knows the exact intrinsics.