跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2611.01550 · v1

Detecting Generated-Depth Injection Attacks on RGB-D Place Authentication

首次提交 2026-11-01 12:21
版本更新 2026-11-01 12:21
雷达观测 2026-11-04 23:43
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Advances in monocular depth estimation (MDE) now let an attacker generate depth from publicly available RGB images and submit forged RGB-D queries. Such attacks break a core assumption of RGB-D place authentication: that depth comes from a sensor. We study a presentation attack detection (PAD) classifier that uses geometric consistency between the enrollment and query views, as a software-layer defense. A three-stage evaluation shows how far this classifier detects software-injected depth, depending on how accurately the attacker knows the camera intrinsics. In the first stage, the attacker has only an estimate of the intrinsics, and the PAD classifier separates forgeries generated by all three MDE models with a validation area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) of 0.997-0.999. In the second stage, the attacker obtains the exact intrinsics, and the original PAD classifier falls to near chance (AUC 0.54-0.61); a retrained PAD classifier, however, still has the registration residual between enrollment and query as a cue. In the third stage, an oracle evaluation, in which the evaluator fits warps using the ground-truth 3D geometry, shows that detection falls to near chance only in its strongest case, where every valid query keypoint is given its ground-truth 3D coordinate. Of the detection cues, the reprojection error captures the attacker's misestimate of the intrinsics, whereas the registration residual remains even when the attacker knows the exact intrinsics.

作者备注:6 pages, 1 figure, 1 table. Accepted to IEEE WIFS 2026. (c) 2026 IEEE

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

目前只观测到一个版本,无法比较变化。之后收录新版本时,会在这里对照标题、作者、分类和摘要。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v1 · 2026-11-01 12:21 · 最新观测版本

Detecting Generated-Depth Injection Attacks on RGB-D Place Authentication

Advances in monocular depth estimation (MDE) now let an attacker generate depth from publicly available RGB images and submit forged RGB-D queries. Such attacks break a core assumption of RGB-D place authentication: that depth comes from a sensor. We study a presentation attack detection (PAD) classifier that uses geometric consistency between the enrollment and query views, as a software-layer defense. A three-stage evaluation shows how far this classifier detects software-injected depth, depending on how accurately the attacker knows the camera intrinsics. In the first stage, the attacker has only an estimate of the intrinsics, and the PAD classifier separates forgeries generated by all three MDE models with a validation area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) of 0.997-0.999. In the second stage, the attacker obtains the exact intrinsics, and the original PAD classifier falls to near chance (AUC 0.54-0.61); a retrained PAD classifier, however, still has the registration residual between enrollment and query as a cue. In the third stage, an oracle evaluation, in which the evaluator fits warps using the ground-truth 3D geometry, shows that detection falls to near chance only in its strongest case, where every valid query keypoint is given its ground-truth 3D coordinate. Of the detection cues, the reprojection error captures the attacker's misestimate of the intrinsics, whereas the registration residual remains even when the attacker knows the exact intrinsics.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗