We consider the problem of graph private information retrieval (PIR) in the quantum setting. We focus on a specific type of graphs, namely the forest graphs. A forest graph is a union of disjoint trees. We consider the quantum setting where all the servers share an entangled state. Each server is allowed to send only one qudit per retrieval round. We design a scheme for the forest graphs that achieves the rate of $\frac{3}{N}$. The scheme uses a GHZ state as the initial entangled state between the servers prior to the scheme initiation. We compare our scheme with the only work done in the literature that considered the quantum setting of graph PIR. We show that our scheme is more efficient in this setting. We derive the quantum capacity for the case of $G=3K_2$, which is equal to $4/6$. $G=3K_2$ is a special case of the forest graph. We design a scheme that is specialized for this graph, achieving a rate equal to $4/6$ and provide the corresponding matching upper bound, establishing it as the capacity.
Advanced power adjusting block withholding attacks such as PAW and T-PAW have been analyzed so far under a global-reset version of the proportional scheme (GRP), which is rarely used in practice. In this paper, we analyze T-PAW, which contains FAW and PAW as special cases, under the block-dependent payout schemes deployed in practice: Pay-Per-Last-N-Shares (PPLNS), round-based Proportional (PROP) and exponential-decay (EXP). We derive the revenue ratios analytically, by renewal arguments for PPLNS and through the stationary carry process of an open round for PROP and EXP. We further introduce Power Adjusting Hopping (PAH), where an adversary of any size adjusts its power allocation towards the pool according to the blockwork age of the round without withholding any block, and derive its revenue ratios under PROP and EXP. We show that GRP misestimates the T-PAW gain in a scheme-dependent direction: it overstates the gain under PROP up to an order of magnitude and understates it under EXP for the original slush decay rate. PROP is highly vulnerable to PAH, while EXP faces a trade-off: a slow decay invites PAH and a fast decay invites T-PAW. PPLNS is the least vulnerable scheme: it is immune to PAH and it mitigates, but does not eliminate, T-PAW. All analytical results are verified by Monte Carlo simulations.
In federated learning (FL), secure aggregation enables a server to compute the sum of local model updates of $N$ clients, without revealing any information on the individual model updates to the server, beyond their sum. Different clients may be subject to heterogeneous bandwidth constraints, and consequently may choose different numbers of quantization levels to represent the information they send. Most secure aggregation works require the clients to project the values of their update parameters to a common finite group (or field), which does not directly accommodate heterogeneous precision constraints on their transmitted masked updates. Existing approaches of secure aggregation with heterogeneous quantization levels reveal partial aggregates of model-updates, and can reveal segments of individual model updates, under certain dropout and client-server collusion patterns. To prevent this privacy breach, we propose an information-theoretic secure aggregation scheme that tolerates client drop-outs, and up to $T$ semi-honest clients that collude with each other and with the server, under heterogeneous quantization at clients. Our protocol utilizes the $(T+1, N)$ threshold black-box secret sharing construction, where secret shares of the client updates, despite belonging to distinct algebraic groups owing to different quantization, are generated from identical linear integer systems.