VeriNC: Finding Design Risks of In-Network Computing Systems
Tianyu Bai, Xiaoxi Zhang, Haoqing Wang, Ying Zhang, Wenfei Wu
The emergence of programmable switches has brought in-network computing (INC) into the spotlight in recent years. By offloading computation directly onto the data transmission process, INC improves network utilization, reduces latency to sub-RTT levels, saves link bandwidth, and maintains throughput. However, INC disrupts the transparency of traditional networks, forcing developers to consider network exceptions like packet loss and out-of-order. If not properly handled, these exceptions can lead to violations of application properties, such as cache consistency and lock exclusion. Usual testing cannot exhaustively cover these exceptions, raising doubts about the correctness of INC systems and hindering their deployment in the industry. This paper presents VeriNC, the first general-purpose tool for verifying INC systems. VeriNC provides a high-level specification language and saves developers 67.2% lines of code on average. To help better understand the behavior of the system, VeriNC offers configurable network environments. VeriNC enables developers to express INC-specific correctness properties. VeriNC translates developer-specified systems into state transition representations, performs model checking to detect potential design risks, and reports violation traces to developers. We propose optimizations for INC-specific scenarios to address the challenge of state space explosion. We modeled INC systems across four application domains and identified design risks with VeriNC in seconds. VeriNC has also been adopted to guide the design of a new INC protocol. Based on our verification experience, we summarize lessons that help develop a correct INC protocol. We further reproduce them in real systems to confirm the validity of our verification result.
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