Protecting Sensitive Knowledge Under LLM Unlearning: The Proxy Threat and a Superposition-Aware Defense
Jiayang Li, Tianqing Zhu, Longxiang Gao, Huajie Chen, Dayong Ye, Shang Wang, Huan Huo, Wanlei Zhou
原文摘要
Machine unlearning lets the owner of large language models (LLMs) remove specific entities from a trained model without retraining from scratch. Existing machine unlearning methods focus on removing the requested entities while maintaining utility. However, we observe that the representations of distinct entities in an LLM may overlap in shared parameter subspaces, a phenomenon known as knowledge superposition. Removing one entity may then affect other entities. This exposes a new security threat: legitimate unlearning requests can be exploited to remove sensitive entities that were never requested. This threat is unlike data poisoning or backdoor attacks. We define the attack as the Proxy Unlearning Attack (PUA), which selects removable proxy entities superposed with a sensitive target. The attack can even occur unintentionally, when benign users accidentally remove entities superposed with a sensitive one. In response, we propose Superposition-Aware Unlearning Protection (SAUP), a general defense framework that can be applied to unlearning requests to ensure a correct removal. SAUP performs in two stages. Before unlearning, it uses superposition detection to estimate which sensitive entities the request puts at risk. After unlearning, it decouples the shared representations and restores the affected entities, while keeping the requested entities suppressed. Our findings reveal that legitimate unlearning requests can be maliciously exploited through knowledge superposition. When dealing with unlearning requests, LLM providers need representation-level detection and recovery mechanisms to mitigate this threat and protect sensitive knowledge.
cs.CR