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arXiv 最近完成扫描:等待完成 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-02 00:39各信源进度 →

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新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.37657

安全注意力头:学习式注意力门提升提示注入鲁棒性

Heads of Security: Learned Attention Gates Improve Prompt Injection Robustness

Igor Shilov, Xiaoxue Yang, Alexander Panfilov, Evgenii Kortukov, Matthieu Meeus, Peter Romov, Wojciech Samek, Jonas Geiping 等 9 位作者

AI 速览:提出 Heads of Security(HoS),用少量可学习的逐头注意力门实现指令与数据分离,从而在不明显损失效用的前提下提升对提示注入攻击的鲁棒性。

We introduce Heads of Security (HoS), a prompt injection defense that enforces instruction-data separation via a small set of learned per-head attention gates. HoS learns how each head should redistribute attention between trusted and untrusted tokens, enabling models to reason over untrusted content without following injected instructions. We evaluate HoS on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct and GPT-OSS-20B. We compare it against SecAlign++, a state-of-the-art finetuning-based defense, and ASIDE, a defense that, like ours, builds instruction-data separation into the model architecture. We show that HoS offers greater robustness to adaptive attacks, better performance on standard utility benchmarks, and matches top performance on standard agentic prompt injection benchmarks. More specifically, the black-box RL-Hammer attack reaches 97% ASR against GPT-OSS-20B and 85% against SecAlign, but only 10% against HoS. Claudini, a state-of-the-art white-box attack, strengthened against HoS through autoresearch, requires 3 times more FLOPs to reach the same ASR on HoS as it does on GPT-OSS-20B or SecAlign. HoS preserves base-model utility across standard multiple-choice benchmarks and prompting setups, whereas SecAlign and ASIDE degrade in few-shot settings. On agentic benchmarks with static attacks, HoS and SecAlign perform similarly and substantially improve the security-utility trade-off over the base model. ASIDE struggles with tool use, achieving only 10% utility. These results show that prompt injection robustness can be achieved and improved through targeted attention interventions.

cs.LG · cs.CL · cs.CR
arXiv ↗PDF ↗
版本更新 · v3arXiv:2610.08327

MedZERO: Self-Evolving Agents for Open-Ended Medical Reasoning Through Controlled Knowledge Accumulation

Xilin Dang, Weilin Ruan, Xue Yang, Jinghao Wang, Xiaowei Hu, Jinpeng Li, Pheng-Ann Heng

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in medical question answering and clinical reasoning, yet their improvement remains constrained by static parametric knowledge and costly expert supervision. Self-evolving agents offer a promising alternative by enabling models to improve through iterative task generation and problem-solving. However, most existing self-evolving methods are designed for easily verifiable domains such as mathematics and coding, where solutions can be checked by exact answers or executable programs. Medical reasoning is fundamentally different: it is open-ended, knowledge-intensive, and often only partially verifiable. We present MedZERO, a self-evolving framework for open-ended medical reasoning. MedZERO couples an Examiner that generates frontier medical question-option pairs with a Reasoner that solves them through evidence-grounded multi-turn reasoning with external knowledge tools. To support reliable, continual improvement, MedZERO adopts controlled knowledge accumulation, which maintains temporary exploratory knowledge and curated persistent knowledge in reasoning. We evaluate MedZERO on five public medical reasoning benchmarks using 4B- and 8B-scale base models under open-ended evaluation. At both model scales, MedZERO achieves the highest average accuracy among the evaluated methods. Code available at https://github.com/IcecreamArtist/MedZERO.

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cs.AI
arXiv ↗PDF ↗
首次观测 · 记录 #1ACL Anthology · ACL 2026:acl:2026.acl-long.1034ACL Anthology · ACL 2026

Red Teaming Large Reasoning Models

Jiawei Chen, Yang Yang, Chao Yu Tsinghua University, Yu Tian, Zhi Cao, Xue Yang Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Linghao Li East China Normal University, Hang Su 等 9 位作者

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have emerged as a powerful advancement in multi-step reasoning tasks, offering enhanced transparency and logical consistency through explicit chains of thought (CoT). However, these models introduce novel safety and reliability risks, such as CoT-hijacking and prompt-induced inefficiencies, which are not fully captured by existing evaluation methods. To address this gap, we propose Rt-LRM, a unified benchmark designed to assess the trustworthiness of LRMs. Rt-LRM evaluates three core dimensions: truthfulness, safety and efficiency. Beyond metric-based evaluation, we further introduce the training paradigm as a key analytical perspective to investigate the systematic impact of different training strategies on model trustworthiness. We achieve this by designing a curated suite of 30 reasoning tasks from an observational standpoint. We conduct extensive experiments on 26 models and identify several valuable insights into the trustworthiness of LRMs. For example, LRMs generally face trustworthiness challenges and tend to be more fragile than Large Language Models (LLMs) when encountering reasoning-induced risks. These findings uncover previously underexplored vulnerabilities and highlight the need for more targeted evaluations. In addition, we release a scalable toolbox for standardized trustworthiness research to support future advancements in this important field.

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cs.CL

Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表

ACL Anthology · ACL 2026 ↗PDF ↗
首次观测 · 记录 #1ACL Anthology · ACL 2026:acl:2026.acl-long.1120ACL Anthology · ACL 2026

Safe-FedLLM: Delving into the Safety of Federated Large Language Models

Mingxiang Tao Hainan University, Yu Tian, Wenxuan Tu, Yue Yang Hainan University, Xue Yang Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Xiangyan Tang Hainan University

Federated learning (FL) addresses privacy and data-silo issues in the training of large language models (LLMs). Most prior work focuses on improving the efficiency of federated learning for LLMs (FedLLM). However, security in open federated environments, particularly defenses against malicious clients, remains underexplored. To investigate the security of FedLLM, we conduct a preliminary study to analyze potential attack surfaces and defensive characteristics from the perspective of LoRA updates. We find two key properties of FedLLM: 1) LLMs are vulnerable to attacks from malicious clients in FL, and 2) LoRA updates exhibit distinct behavioral patterns that can be effectively distinguished by lightweight classifiers. Based on these properties, we propose Safe-FedLLM, a probe-based defense framework for FedLLM, which constructs defenses across three levels: Step-Level, Client-Level, and Shadow-Level. The core concept of Safe-FedLLM is to perform probe-based discrimination on each client’s local LoRA updates, treating them as high-dimensional behavioral features and using a lightweight classifier to determine whether they are malicious. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Safe-FedLLM effectively improves FedLLM’s robustness against malicious clients while maintaining competitive performance on benign data. Notably, our method effectively suppresses the impact of malicious data without significantly affecting training speed, and remains effective even under high malicious client ratios.

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cs.CL

Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表

ACL Anthology · ACL 2026 ↗PDF ↗
首次观测 · 记录 #1ACL Anthology · ACL 2026:acl:2026.acl-long.1172ACL Anthology · ACL 2026

Learning to Think on Hypergraph: HyperCoT for Structure-Guided N-ary Knowledge Graph Completion

Mengxue Yang, Jinming Li, Chun Yang, Jiaqi Zhu Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Jiafan Li, Guanhua Zhang Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences, Ying Li University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences

N-ary knowledge graph completion (KGC) aims to infer missing components in facts with multiple entities under distinct semantic roles, commonly formulated as a knowledge hypergraph link prediction task. Most embedding-based approaches score individual hyperedges relying on enriched structural representations, but overlook intermediate propagation states containing complementary local and global structural evidence. Despite their capability to generate chain-of-thought (CoT) representations for the classical KGC task, large language models (LLMs) struggle with hypergraph structure involving multiple facts, while current hypergraph QA methods only provide LLMs with a single query signal rather than path-level evidence. These limitations hinder the transferability of existing methods, especially those leveraging LLMs, to solve the knowledge hypergraph link prediction problem. To bridge this gap, we propose HyperCoT, a structure-aware approach that models multi-hop structural reasoning as a depth-sensitive progressive evidence accumulation process. It constructs a Graphical Chain-of-Thought (Graph-CoT) by aggregating role-aware hyperedge states along strongly correlated reasoning paths, and injects the resulting path-level structural evidence into each token in query and candidate entities to prompt LLMs. Experiments on three real-world datasets demonstrate that HyperCoT consistently outperforms strong n-ary KGC baselines, particularly in high arity and structural sparsity scenarios, meanwhile yielding interpretable multi-hop reasoning traces.

尚无 AI 解读,展示原文摘要

cs.CL

Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表

ACL Anthology · ACL 2026 ↗PDF ↗