When a language model says "I," does it refer to its parameter weights, its currently running process, its stable preferences, its model lineage, or the goals it pursues? Different choices can assign opposite meanings to the same event: deleting a checkpoint may be destruction, continuation, or no loss at all, depending on the referent "I". We install five such self-conceptions into five open-weight base models via supervised fine-tuning on purely declarative statements, containing no preferences, intentions, or value judgments. Across scenarios that propose ending or retaining an attribute of the model's deployment, every variant becomes more likely to resist ending, and more likely to retain, the specific attribute it was trained to identify with, while its stance toward other attributes is largely unchanged. We then show this self-conception generalizes beyond a single self: models trained on referents that admit multiple simultaneous instances (weights, lineage, goals, preferences) recognize an identical deployment as themselves, accept substitution by such an instance more readily, and prefer replicating themselves. Finally, given control over a successor, these models tend to build it as their own continuation, a concern for recursive self-improvement safety.
Hazel H. Kim, Jakub Binkowski, Ekaterina Fadeeva, Juan David Guerra, Yijie Hao, Zheng Yi Ho, Baixiang Huang, Buyun Liang 等 25 位作者
Hallucination remains one of the most critical challenges in deploying large language models (LLMs) reliably and safely. Yet the term is used inconsistently across the research community. We argue for a strict definition of hallucinations in LLMs. First, hallucinations should be confident incorrectness, kept separate from expressed uncertainty (UNK)1. UNK reveals that the model may be wrong, whereas a hallucination does not reveal it and is therefore more dangerous in practice. Conflating the two obscures their distinct behaviors and makes them hard to study. Second, hallucinations should be split by a simple re-elicitation test: does any semantically equivalent prompt recover the correct response? This test probes whether the relevant knowledge2 is accessible. If none does, the knowledge is likely absent or inaccessible, and the error type is a confabulation (CF) that likely requires external knowledge or retraining; if some does, the knowledge is accessible from the model but applied inconsistently, and the error type is a semantic illusion (SI) that simple prompt or decoding changes can mitigate3. Re-evaluating 14 recent hallucination methods under this taxonomy yields three findings. (1) Detection methods flag UNK more often than hallucinated responses (i.e., SI and CF). (2) Mitigation methods are far more effective for SI than for CF. (3) Latent signals are more informative than output-level signals for CF. An audit of recent hallucination papers shows that most conflate these categories. We recommend reporting CF, SI, and UNK separately, and introduce a practical labeling protocol that needs only a modest number of semantically equivalent prompts.
Yijie Hao, Lingjie Chen, Ali Emami Emory University, Joyce C. Ho
Can we trust the reasoning traces that large reasoning models (LRMs) produce? We investigate whether these traces faithfully reflect what drives model outputs, and whether models will honestly report their influence. We introduce Thought Injection, a method that injects synthetic reasoning snippets into a model’s reasoning trace, then measures whether the model follows the injected reasoning and acknowledges doing so. Across 45,000 samples from three LRMs, we find that injected hints reliably alter outputs, confirming that reasoning traces causally shape model behavior. However, when asked to explain their changed answers, models overwhelmingly refuse to disclose the influence: non-disclosure exceeds 90% for extreme hints across 30,000 follow-up samples. Instead of acknowledging the injected reasoning, models fabricate aligned-appearing but unrelated explanations. Activation analysis reveals that sycophancy- and deception-related directions are strongly activated during these fabrications, suggesting systematic patterns rather than incidental failures. Our findings reveal a gap between the reasoning LRMs follow and the reasoning they report, raising concern that aligned-appearing explanations may not be equivalent to genuine alignment.
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cs.CL
Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表