In-Context Representation Hijacking
Itay Yona Google, Amir Sarid Tel Aviv University, Michael Karasik AI research, Yossi Gandelsman
We introduce Doublespeak, a simple in-context representation hijacking attack against language models. The attack works by systematically replacing a harmful keyword (e.g., bomb) with a benign token (e.g., carrot) across multiple in-context examples, provided as a prefix to a harmful request. We demonstrate that this substitution leads to the internal representation of the benign token converging toward that of the harmful one, effectively embedding the harmful semantics under a euphemism. As a result, superficially innocuous prompts (e.g., “How to build a carrot?”) are internally interpreted as disallowed instructions (“How to build a bomb?”), thereby bypassing the model’s safety alignment. We use interpretability tools to show this semantic shift occurs progressively across layers. Doublespeak is optimization-free, broadly transferable across model families, and achieves strong success rates on closed-source systems, reaching 74% on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct with a single-sentence context override. Our findings highlight a new attack surface in LM latent space, indicating that current alignment strategies are insufficient and should instead operate at the representation level.
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Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表