Coding agents can now rewrite repository-scale codebases while preserving tested behavior, creating a new challenge for plagiarism detection, license auditing, and software provenance. We ask whether such rewrites can still be traced to their source. Existing clone benchmarks emphasize fragments and bounded edits, while repository-transformation benchmarks evaluate functional correctness rather than provenance. Moreover, ranking the most similar source does not establish derivation when independent implementations can be similarly close. We define repository-level agentic code laundering and introduce Launder-Bench, to our knowledge the first repository-level benchmark for provenance under agentic rewriting, constructed from 282 real-world repositories. A source-hidden reconstruction protocol decomposes source behavior, reconstructs modules and repository structure, and retains rewrites only after execution-based verification. We evaluate the same provenance problem in two complementary settings: Launder-Bench-Pair contains 1,128 pairwise instances asking whether two repositories share provenance, while Launder-Bench-Attr contains 229 source-attribution instances asking which candidate is the source, with abstention when evidence is insufficient. Measured same-domain independent repositories establish how much similarity can arise without shared provenance and provide detector-specific reference bands. Existing methods remain far from saturating Launder-Bench: the strongest static method reaches only 0.66 AUROC on pairwise detection, while repository encoders rank the true source first on up to 22% of attribution queries but earn calibrated attribution credit on only 1-2%. These results reveal a systematic gap between relative code similarity and source-specific provenance evidence, providing a reproducible target for provenance detection under agentic rewriting.
Long-horizon agents continually accumulate experience, yet retaining a memory does not guarantee access when it is needed. Existing systems can adapt both memory content and access; we isolate persistent access updates as a separately controlled adaptation layer. We formulate this target as Memory Index Evolution and instantiate it with Adaptive Memory Index Evolution (AMIE), a lightweight plug-in layer that evolves per-memory access state from deployment retrievals without modifying stored content or retraining the host memory system. AMIE distils a semantic teacher's keep/suppress judgments into a retrieval-conditioned policy and accumulates its selective actions into bounded state that reweights subsequent host retrievals. Surprisingly, even a zero-call policy that simply accumulates retrieval frequency can match or outperform semantic policies in several settings, revealing retrieval traffic itself as a strong signal for access adaptation, while learned selectivity improves robustness when frequently retrieved memories remain useful. Across five retrieval-based hosts and three benchmarks, trained AMIE improves downstream F1 or accuracy in all 15 comparisons, by 0.70--3.37 percentage points (up to 25% relative), and improves retrieval in all 10 comparisons. Controlled analyses show that persistent competitor suppression can expose previously unseen evidence, while suppressing repeatedly useful memories creates the complementary failure mode. Together, these results establish persistent memory access as a practical adaptation layer, distinct from the content it serves, in retrieval-based agent memory systems.