Yu Jiang, Yue Huang, Hang Hua, Yuyang Wu, Zixuan Weng, Olexandr Isayev, Yue Zhao, Zinan Lin 等 9 位作者
Long-horizon terminal tasks are used to evaluate and train agents. Human-curated datasets are scarce, so many synthesis methods have emerged. They usually measure the length of a task by the turns a model needs to pass it, and its difficulty by labels the LLM sets during generation. We find, however, that the turn count largely reflects the habits of the model, not only the demands of the task, and that the labels barely track how often models pass. We describe a terminal task by its work, the number of operations it requires, and its depth, the number of turns that must happen in sequence because the commands of each turn can only be chosen after reading the output of the previous one. Estimating depth as the smallest turn cap, stated to the agent, under which the task passes, we audit 734 tasks from six existing datasets. Synthesis has mostly added work, not depth: 94% of the solved synthetic tasks pass within three turns, yet depth, unlike the turn count, predicts difficulty beyond work. We propose DEPTH, in which a generation agent writes each task one segment at a time in a real software environment, carrying out each segment before writing it and starting the next from the state it leaves. Our 105 tasks exceed every audited dataset in depth and work, and none of six current models passes half of them. Fine-tuning Qwen3-8B on runs from these tasks improves it on two terminal benchmarks.
AI 速览：该研究考察由大生成模型构成的多智能体系统在共享资源竞争、顺序交接与集体决策等场景中自发出现的群体性失败模式。
Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.
Chengquan Guo, Yuzhou Nie, Chulin Xie, Zinan Lin, Wenbo Guo, Bo Li
Existing research on CodeGen AI security mainly focuses on red teaming, which aims to uncover vulnerabilities and risks in AI-generated code. However, progress on the blue teaming side remains limited, as effective defenses require a deep security analysis of given tasks and edge cases. To fill in this gap, we propose BlueCodeAgent, an end-to-end blue teaming agent powered by automated red teaming. Our red teaming component generates diverse risky instances, providing effective edge cases and guidance for the subsequent blue teaming process. Our blue teaming agent then conducts multi-level defense, leveraging these red teaming examples to detect previously seen and unseen risk scenarios through constitution summarization and dynamic code analysis. Our evaluation across four representative code-related tasks (bias instruction detection, malicious instruction detection, vulnerable code detection, and prompt injection detection) shows that BlueCodeAgent achieves significant gains over diverse baselines. In particular, for vulnerability detection tasks, BlueCodeAgent integrates dynamic analysis to effectively reduce false positives, a challenging problem as base models tend to be over-conservative. Overall, with GPT-4o as the base model, BlueCodeAgent achieves an average F1 score improvement of 14.7% across four tasks compared to directly prompting the model, attributed to its ability to summarize actionable constitutions and perform dynamic analysis. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/1mocat/BlueCodeAgent.
Chengquan Guo, Chulin Xie, Yu Yang, Zhaorun Chen, Zinan Lin, Xander Davies, Yarin Gal, Dawn Song 等 9 位作者
Code agents have gained widespread adoption due to their strong code generation capabilities and integration with code interpreters, enabling dynamic execution, debugging, and interactive programming capabilities. While these advancements have streamlined complex workflows, they have also introduced critical safety and security risks. Current static safety benchmarks and red-teaming tools are inadequate for identifying emerging real-world risky scenarios, as they fail to cover certain boundary conditions, such as the combined effects of different jailbreak tools. In this work, we propose RedCodeAgent, the first automated red-teaming agent designed to systematically uncover vulnerabilities in diverse code agents. With an adaptive memory module, RedCodeAgent can leverage existing jailbreak knowledge, dynamically select the most effective red-teaming tools and tool combinations in a tailored toolbox for a given input query, thus identifying vulnerabilities that might otherwise be overlooked. For reliable evaluation, we develop simulated sandbox environments to additionally evaluate the execution results of code agents, mitigating potential biases of LLM-based judges that only rely on static code. Through extensive evaluations across multiple state-of-the-art code agents, diverse risky scenarios, and various programming languages, RedCodeAgent consistently outperforms existing red-teaming methods, achieving higher attack success rates and lower rejection rates with high efficiency. We further validate RedCodeAgent on real-world code assistants, e.g., Cursor and Codeium, exposing previously unidentified security risks. By automating and optimizing red-teaming processes, RedCodeAgent enables scalable, adaptive, and effective safety assessments of code agents. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/1mocat/RedCodeAgent.