Gonçalo Fernandes, José Cecílio, Victor Mattos, Daniel S. Menasché, Amit Bhaya, Alan Oliveira de Sá
原文摘要
AI-driven attacks learn the models of cyber-physical systems (CPS) by passively observing controller and plant signals, then use this knowledge to act covertly. Because covertness depends on the accuracy of the identified model, degrading that accuracy is a viable countermeasure. This work applies Adversarial Machine Learning as a defense, injecting small perturbations into the measurements the attacker observes to degrade an artificial neural network (ANN)-based system identification (SI) attack. The perturbations are derived from input gradients of several independently trained identification models, aggregated into a generalized perturbation, and confined to the transient regimes that carry most of the dynamic information. A sparsity parameter further restricts them to the most influential samples, with negligible cost in effectiveness. On a simulated DC motor networked control system, the proposed perturbations induce larger prediction errors than stochastic poisoning of equal root-mean-square magnitude, and the advantage widens as the magnitude grows. This limits the defense's operating range, which is intended for decoy environments such as CPS honeynets. Additional results indicate that the designed poisoning signals can also degrade N4SID-based system identification, providing evidence of their transferability beyond the ANN-based models originally targeted.
Victor Mattos, Guilherme Sobreira, Amit Bhaya, Alan Oliveira de Sá, Charles B. Prado, Raphael Machado, Gaurav Srivastava, Daniel S. Menasche
原文摘要
This paper studies covert system identification in cyber-physical systems, where an attacker infers plant dynamics while attempting to remain stealthy. We introduce a lightweight static linear model in which the time to execute a setpoint change is proportional to the commanded speed difference. On a Siemens PROFINET testbed this gain captures the drive's ramp response accurately but not its terminal overshoot. That omitted transient becomes the attacker's main exposure: on real traces, the residual left by the linear masking procedure is detected by two anomaly monitors, Process-Aware Stealthy-Attack Detection (PASAD) and the CUSUM change detector. Across the cascade identification and staircase attack strategies defined in the paper, the stealth boundary relates to the plant's own settling transients, a structural limit for this class of models under the adopted detector-calibration regime. Comparison against dynamic models obtained by N4SID, trained at multiple excitation amplitudes, shows that the evaluated N4SID models do not improve stealth over the structure-informed ramp model. Since per-cycle computation is negligible for both procedures, the binding trade-off is not inference cost but whether the attacker can acquire and refresh a model without injecting detectable perturbations.