Alignment by Socialization: Learning Tradeoffs Under Selection
Thomas Brennan, Andrew W. Lo, Chaoyi Zhao
原文摘要
Artificial intelligence (AI) agents are expected to complete tasks while following rules of conduct, but these objectives can conflict. We study how evolutionary selection shapes an agent's choices between them, and whether experience can make those choices reflect human judgments and withstand subsequent pressures. In our model, copies of an agent face a common uncertain reward state, and only those taking the rewarded action reproduce. We show that long-run growth is maximized when each action is taken as often as the environment rewards it. We compare three policies. A task-only policy thrives in a sandbox rewarding completion alone but fails when conduct matters. A fixed linear policy increasingly favors task completion as its stakes rise, even where humans never reward it. A learned policy instead converges to the tradeoffs rewarded by its environment; when humans supply the rewards, we call this socialization. Accumulated experience makes socialization harder to reverse under subsequent task-only training, although violations can arise before the prevailing disposition changes, and finite memory weakens this protection. When a single violation can end a deployment, a hard prohibition can prevent it, but a mistaken prohibition can also be costly. Experiments with small neural networks illustrate how training targets and memory shape these outcomes. Our results suggest that alignment depends not only on the objectives assigned to agents, but also on the environments that shape and sustain their behavior.
cs.AI · q-bio.PE · q-fin.GN