论文库

原文摘要

Hardware fault injection attacks threaten machine learning systems, yet their impact on reinforcement learning (RL) has received little attention despite the use of RL in safety-critical applications. This paper presents a security analysis of Q-Learning implementations under voltage and clock glitching attacks on a ChipWhisperer platform, evaluating five variants: Standard, Robust, Resilient, Linear, and Deep Q-Learning. In standard Q-Table implementations, faults corrupt reward computation, action selection, and Q-value updates during learning, and change the selected action during inference. Robust Q-Learning does not prevent these attacks: NaN and infinite values injected during learning persist in the Q-table, and its greedy policy uses the same code as standard Q-Learning. This paper also evaluates a Resilient Q-Learning variant that applies triple modular redundancy with majority voting. It corrects corruption of a single Q-table copy, but inputs shared by the copies, such as the reward, and the voting code itself remain outside its protection. The analysis extends to Linear and Deep Q-Learning, where faults corrupt stored weights during learning and change actions during inference. Moving beyond benchmark environments, this work evaluates an online traffic light controller in a microscopic traffic simulator, where a single injected infinite value degrades accumulated vehicle waiting time by 148x while corrupting under 4% of the Q-table, and where triple modular redundancy corrected the faults injected in our tests, although glitching could still halt the device. Altogether, this work provides a basis for understanding and securing RL deployments against fault injection attacks.