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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2605.18990

凹函数是新线性:女巫攻击瓦解反财阀DAO投票

Concave is the New Linear: Sybil Attacks Collapse Anti-Plutocratic DAO Voting

Austin Bennett, Preston Vander Vos, Mira Belenkiy, Duc V. Le

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作者证明在无需许可区块链上,任何仅依赖钱包余额的投票规则都无法抵御女巫攻击,凹形规则(如二次投票)下攻击者通过拆分钱包可获得随持币量线性增长的投票权,并在真实DAO中量化了放大效应。

cs.GT · cs.CR

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Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) run protocol governance by letting token holders vote on proposals. The dominant rule, voting power proportional to wallet balance, concentrates control among a small number of large holders, fueling the token-control governance attacks that have already compromised real protocols. To counter this concentration, the community has turned to anti-plutocratic voting mechanisms such as Quadratic Voting (QV), which assign sublinear voting power per token with the goal of dampening the influence of large holders. We prove that no voting rule that derives power solely from wallet balance can succeed on a permissionless blockchain. Through a costed model of on-chain voting that captures realistic blockchain frictions -- including per-wallet splitting and voting costs, fixed setup costs, and minimum-balance requirements -- we show that whenever a wallet of any size yields nonzero voting power, a Sybil attacker who splits tokens across many wallets achieves total voting power that grows at least linearly in their token holdings. For concave rules actually proposed to dampen governance power -- those that are positive, increasing, and finite -- we show that the optimal strategy yields power that is asymptotically linear in token holdings, regardless of the cost scheme. Instantiating the model on real DAOs reveals attack costs orders of magnitude below the value at stake. Replaying the ten most recent finalized proposals of five major DAOs (ENS, Compound, Uniswap, Arbitrum, and ZKsync) under linear, quadratic, logarithmic, and power-($β= 0.25$) voting, we measure Sybil amplification factors between $1,172\times$ and $4,039\times$ under Quadratic Voting, and exceeding $229,000\times$ under steeper power rules.