Authorization of distributed energy resource (DER) commands judges a command by who sent it and whether its value has been seen before. An attacker holding a legitimate credential who writes ordinary values passes both tests. We add a check that judges each DER write against the grid's operating context: the bus voltages around the target, the hour, the day- ahead price, system load, and irradiance, compared with what operators wrote under similar conditions in the feeder's own benign history. We evaluate it live on the IEEE 123-bus and 8500-node feeders, driven by a measured 2024 year of price, load, and irradiance, against nine attack scenarios. A lookup trained on the same history catches none of the writes of the four scenarios that send values already familiar on the targeted device; the context check refuses 91.7% of insider-abuse writes and 64.4% of DER-aggregation writes while denying 1.28% of benign writes. In an offline test that replays recorded moments with curtailment setpoints drawn from the benign range, issued at a positive price, it refuses 47.3% and 50.5% on the two feeders, against 18.5% and 16.0% for the same check without context; live, the few setpoints tested were mostly shallow and were mostly allowed. The context check complements the lookup.
Industrial anomaly detection is evaluated largely on simulators, and recent work reports large drops, with unstable rankings, on real plant data. We ask whether that extends to the security case. We evaluate eleven detectors across classical, neural, dependency and causal families on a simulated chemical process and a sodium thermal-hydraulic facility: different processes sharing no equipment, but both continuous, at steady state, and perturbed only through temperature, pressure, flow and valve, never composition. Three conditions prior work does not cover: disturbances authored against a threat model rather than native faults; one construction applied to both processes; and detection read at a declared false-alarm budget. The drop persists throughout. The simulator panel looks deployable, neural matching classical; on plant telemetry detection collapses and the neural family trails, a gap that in-sample thresholds likely understate. Which detector wins transfers between the two processes; how often it fires does not. Two results hold on both. Sequential valve manipulation defeats the whole panel: at tier 2 no detector flags more than 0.17 of its perturbed samples, against 0.89 or better for most disturbances. And the plant's collapse is not merely that its disturbances are weaker, though they are by about twelvefold; matched on measured strength, the plant is never the better detected.