Adversarial Risk in the Generative AI Era Necessitates Dropping the Small Epsilon Ball
Andrew C. Cullen, Neil G. Marchant, Paul Montague, Jiani Xie, Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein
原文摘要
Adversarial Machine Learning research is currently centered on the search for the epsilon-ball: minimal perturbations designed to fool models while remaining imperceptible to humans. We argue that this fixation on $\ell_p$ norms is a metrological trap that communicates a distorted perception of risk to defenders, one that is unaligned with real-world system vulnerabilities. This paradigm misleads defenders into optimizing for narrow, mathematical robustness at the expense of systemic security, while simultaneously incentivizing attackers to exploit non-overlapping alternative adversarial pathways. Ultimately, we argue that the dominance of the $\ell_p$ ball does not just fail to reduce harm---it may actively facilitate it by communicating a false sense of security against the wrong threats.
cs.LG · cs.CR