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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2608.25697

Language Model Security Modules: Turning LLM Interpretability into Runtime Defense

XiuYu Zhang, Bonan Ruan, Junfeng Fang, An Zhang, Tat-Seng Chua, Zhenkai Liang

原文摘要

Large language models (LLMs) are served behind layered defenses such as alignment and guardrail models, yet jailbreaks still get through. Interpretability research looks inside the model, where methods such as probes and sparse autoencoders expose signals of harmful content during generation. A signal alone, however, is not a defense. To become one, the serving system must tie each signal to the right request, apply the policy as declared, and release output only when the policy allows. Today, defenses built on such signals handle these duties on their own, so every new detector needs its own integration. Yet none of these duties depends on how a signal is computed. We present Language Model Security Modules (LMSM), which adapts the design of Linux Security Modules to LLM serving and carries out these duties once in a shared mediation path. The path hosts pluggable backends that turn model internals into evidence and policies that decide what that evidence allows. Each policy declares the evidence and evaluations it needs, and LMSM provides exactly these for each request and verifies that they took place, so a failure is never mistaken for permission. Protection therefore remains cheap and correct under common serving optimizations. We evaluate LMSM in vLLM, with both eager and compiled execution, on Qwen3-4B and Gemma-3-4B with fitted probes, a released transcoder, and a released sparse autoencoder. With vLLM's default optimizations on, every backend keeps at least 96% of native throughput, and all of them share the same mediation path. On Qwen3-4B, a representative probe-based policy cuts HarmBench attack success from 39.4% to 3.3% while XSTest false refusals rise from 0.8% to 3.1%. LMSM lets existing and future interpretability methods become runtime defenses without rebuilding the serving path.

cs.CR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.24185

Guarding the Kingdom of Skill-Based Agents in the AI Dynasty of Computation: Control-Flow Integrity for Agent Skills

Bonan Ruan, Yuhao Sun, Jiahao Liu, Qixiao Lin, Jian Mao, Zhenkai Liang

原文摘要

Control-flow integrity (CFI) confines a program to a control-flow graph fixed ahead of time. Procedural agent skills move this control flow into prompt text, and a large language model (LLM) agent decides at runtime whether each step runs in its reasoning, a tool call, or a script. The procedure's control skeleton survives, but its enforceability depends on where each step runs. Many violations, such as overwriting a file before validation, use only operations the skill requires, so permission allowlists admit them. A deviating or prompt-injected model can also evade a monitor by regime migration, for example by claiming that a check passed. We present SkillCFI, which carries CFI over to skill-based agents. Its compiler confines LLM interpretation to compile time and derives the agent's instructions and an executable contract from one skill. By a formal enforceability criterion, it enforces obligations whose evidence crosses the tool boundary and rejects a skill whose mandatory obligation leaves nothing to check. A deterministic runtime enforcer admits a tool request only on trusted evidence and refuses unmediated channels such as inline scripts, so admitted traces follow the contract whatever the model proposes. On eight self-written skills, no compiled contract permits more than its source under 24 source mutations. In 770 agent sessions, SkillCFI blocks before dispatch all 240 such violations, which an allowlist admits, and normal tasks complete nearly as often as without it. Listing the next legal steps in a refusal raises recovery from 21% to 65%. Checking takes about 2% of task time, and a compact command form cuts session slowdown from 1.32 times to 1.08 times. None of 53 public skills is accepted as written. The compiler's diagnostics point to interfaces rather than workflows and guided seven into enforceable contracts.

cs.CR