Poker and other games with hidden information are too large to solve in one pass. Strong systems compute a complete blueprint strategy offline and refine it in real time inside the reached subgame. In 2p0s games, a safety theorem guarantees that subgame resolving never increases how much an adversary can gain by exploiting the resolved strategy relative to the blueprint strategy. With three or more players acting independently, no such guarantee exists yet, and heuristic resolving can increase the profile's best-response gap. We prove the first conditional safety theorem for uncorrelated multiplayer subgame resolving, a post-hoc certificate for any delivered update. The best-response gap of the resolved profile exceeds that of the blueprint by at most four terms. Two concern the resolver: the subgame value the blueprint promised without realizing ($A_i^{S}$) and the resolver's subgame solve error ($\varepsilon_i$). The other two are the opponents' best-response gains inside the subgame over their promised values ($\sum_q M_{q}$) and a structural tax ($Θ$), which measures how much the players' total utility can change. The tax is zero in constant-sum games, including every rake-free poker variant. Constructions attain each term with equality. On three-player Leduc poker and on Kuhn poker with up to six players, resolving without a certificate raises the gap beyond a small tolerance in 12% to 100% of the updates. The certificate flags every such update and accepts 41% (Kuhn) and 86% (Leduc) of the standard resolving updates. A resolver that keeps the blueprint whenever the certificate exceeds the tolerance delivers no harmful update. The certificate needs only one best-response pass per opponent inside the subgame, so real-time multiplayer solvers that refine a blueprint can attach it as a safety check. Code is available at https://github.com/lbn187/MultiPlayerSolver
Nikos Salamanos, Paula Gheorghiade, Tom Brughmans, Michele Coscia
原文摘要
Collecting data, including network data, is subject to measurement error. Network backboning is the process of statistically validating each edge in a network to estimate the probability that the edge is born of noisy measurements. The current backboning literature provides approaches in two classes: structural and statistical. The classes differ in many respects, but they share one commonality: the test used to determine whether to filter out noisy edges is data-agnostic; it does not take into account what the network is representing. However, the nodes and edges of all non-synthetic networks correspond to specific real-world entities, whose dynamics determine how the edge-generating process operates. In this paper, we propose the first in a new class of network backboning algorithms: a theory-driven backboning approach that allows us to encode known dynamics into the backboning process. The resulting backbone embeds the encoded theory and produces a network compatible with it, rather than one that obeys a data-agnostic network process, as in the structural and statistical backboning classes. We specifically focus on the case of projecting and backboning a bipartite structure. We do so by allowing users to specify an Agent-Based Model for the two types of agents (nodes) in the network and by performing Simulation-Based Inference to fit the observed bipartite structure and, as a result, reconstruct the true relationships between the two classes of agents. We test our framework both on synthetic data -- where we have perfect information about the edge-generating process -- and in a case study using archaeological data on amphorae retrieved from different archaeological sites. Our approach improves latent-edge recovery over conventional backboning methods in synthetic experiments and reveals interpretable archaeological patterns despite imperfect model fit.