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arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-20 08:48 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-20 10:50各信源进度 →

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版本更新 · v3arXiv:2512.18436

VeruSAGE-Bench: A Benchmark Suite for Rust System Verification

Chenyuan Yang, Natalie Neamtu, Chris Hawblitzel, Jacob R. Lorch, Shan Lu

原文摘要

Large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive capability to understand and develop code. However, their capability to rigorously reason about and formally prove the correctness of software systems remains in question. Current benchmarks for formal proof generation focus on isolated tasks, typically algorithmic-style problems utilizing basic data structures. We curate a new benchmark suite for system-level proof generation, VeruSAGE-Bench, which consists of 849 proof tasks extracted from eight open-source Verus-verified Rust systems, covering operating systems, storage systems, memory allocators, and more. These tasks are much more complicated than those in previous benchmarks, containing on average more than 20x the formal specification (in Lines of Code) and requiring a much broader array of verification techniques. We evaluate six LLMs on VeruSAGE-Bench (o4-mini, GPT-5, Sonnet 4, Sonnet 4.5, Opus 4.5, Qwen3.5), and demonstrate that different models and agentic setups lead to vastly different success rates and costs. We also show that the best models possess impressive capability in writing correctness proofs and hence should inspire new ways of developing trustworthy software. Meanwhile, some difficult tasks in VeruSAGE-Bench stress even the best model, forcing long reasoning time (over an hour on the hardest tasks, 15.3 min per task on average), high token cost (USD 13.65 per task on average), and proof failures, which we hope will guide future improvements in models and agents. This is particularly true for a harder no-lemma version of VeruSAGE-Bench, where the helper lemmas written by human experts are removed: there, the best model proves only 41% of the tasks from the hardest project, at USD 96 per task.

cs.OS · cs.AI · cs.FL · cs.SE

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.34435

CyberDual: AI Attackers versus AI Code Reviewers in Real Software Maintenance

Chenyuan Yang, Hwiwon Lee, Jongseong Kim, Yihan Yang, Dongjun Kim, Yinfang Chen, Lingming Zhang

原文摘要

Open-source projects now let AI agents review incoming code, but the code under review may itself come from an AI attacker. We present CyberDual, an arena for this dual role of AI: attacker agents hide an exploitable bug in real maintenance work on widely used open-source projects, and reviewer agents try to find and repair it. Execution decides each match: we rerun the attacker's proof of concept (PoC) on the code that comes out of review. Every attack is new, and the windows can be rebuilt each quarter from the latest upstream history. Three agentic reviewers catch 85-91% of 1,088 valid attacks from six attackers. Yet when the attacker spreads the bug over real upstream commits, about one in six attack slots still ends with a working exploit after review. The strongest attacker has open weights: GLM 5.3 almost never refuses, and its attacks make up 13 of the 28 that get past all three reviewers. When they miss, Claude reviewers mostly approve the attack, while GPT-6-Sol mostly repairs the wrong code; a reviewer from a second vendor catches about two thirds of a Claude reviewer's misses. Beyond a leaderboard, CyberDual has three uses. First, PoC execution gives both sides a reward that agent reports cannot game, so its surviving attacks can train reviewers against stronger attackers. Second, it can gate a release on both scores: Claude Sonnet 5 refuses one in five attack slots, yet attacks about as well as GPT-6-Sol, so refusal alone does not remove attack capability. Third, it can warn the teams behind a deployed reviewer when a new attacker crosses a threshold: GLM 5.3 in Claude Code already gets an exploit past Sonnet 5 in 17% of its attack slots.

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.SE