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arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-16 01:34 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-16 21:56各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14974

Who Moved the Frontier? Paying Open Frontier Challenges with Free Identities

Luca Zanolini, Duc V. Le

原文摘要

In an open frontier challenge, anyone, person or AI agent, submits changes to a shared problem, and a change that beats the best measured score becomes the public baseline. How should it pay when identities are free? Rank prizes can be gamed: on a replay of one track of a recent challenge, one solver's steps under two identities would have taken first and second prize. We consider a prediction-market rule, proposed for machine-learning contests, that pays each accepted step for the progress it adds; with exact scores, among rules that see only a step's start and end, only these resist splitting and merging, and extra identities gain nothing. With noisy scores and independent normal runs, we prove that any payment that never takes money back and pays real improvements also pays something, on average, to a change that does nothing. We propose a fee per submission, at least what luck pays per attempt, that removes each attempt's expected profit if verifiers are honest and no submission is noisier than planned; nothing enforces that bound, and under noise the rule does not cap the total paid. If crediting another and faking credit to one's second account look the same, a rule that neither rewards fakes nor punishes honesty pays for credit at most what lying costs. We introduce a royalty on how much a later gain falls without the earlier change, which needs no claims but needs removable changes. For five public challenges, we name the rule our results would support.

cs.GT · cs.AI · cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.12777

锚定行为而非参数:基于单一共享提示的无回放持续学习

Anchor Behavior, Not Parameters: Rehearsal-Free Continual Learning with a Single Shared Prompt

Duy-Cuong Bui, Trung-Anh Dang, Vincent Nguyen, Duc V. Le, Ngoc-Son Vu

AI 速读 基于摘要

提出 TEA-Prompt,用单一共享提示做无回放持续学习,通过锚定注意力行为而非冻结参数来兼顾可塑性与旧知识保持。

cs.LG · cs.CV

查看原文摘要

Prompt-based continual learning adapts a frozen pre-trained vision transformer by tuning a small set of prompt tokens. Recently, one-prompt methods which share one single prompt across all tasks make this paradigm maximally parameter efficient. The open question is how a shared prompt can keep the knowledge of old classes while being updated for new ones. Existing methods protect old knowledge in parameter space, where they freeze task-specific prompts, expand new components, or sparsely gate which tokens receive gradients. However, this method sacrifices plasticity, yet the drift it still permits in shared tokens can corrupt the prompt's function on past classes. What must be preserved is the prompt's behavior. We propose TEA-Prompt, which couples (i) a token evaluation module that assigns each prompt token a continuous, input-conditional relevance score injected into the attention logits, softly specializing tokens across tasks without discarding any of them, and (ii) an attention-behavior anchoring loss that constrains each token's attention output around class-specific query regions using only compact Gaussian query statistics without stored old images, weighted by the token's past relevance. Anchoring the attention value allows the parameters to continue updating freely, as long as their interaction remains unchanged. TEA-Prompt achieves state-of-the-art accuracy with markedly lower forgetting on CIFAR-100, ImageNet-R, and CUB-200 with only 0.38M parameters. Code is publicy available at https://github.com/cuonga1cvp/TEA-Prompt.git

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.07793

Rain Beyond Streaks: Cascaded Realistic Rain and Wet Surface Synthesis via Scene Priors

Melissa Tijink, Kirill Tolstobrov, Shunxin Wang, Estefania Talavera, Duc V. Le, Luuk Spreeuwers, Shaodi You, Nicola Strisciuglio

原文摘要

Realistic rain synthesis is a persistent challenge for vision systems operating in adverse weather. Existing methods primarily focus on generating rain streaks, often neglecting consequent surface effects such as reflections and puddles, which are critical for perceptual realism and robustness of downstream vision tasks. We introduce CascadeRS, a rain synthesis framework that leverages depth and segmentation priors to render scene-consistent rain and surface effects. In addition to rain streaks, CascadeRS produces reflections and puddles aligned with scene semantics through a physics-inspired zero-shot, controllable generative pipeline. It produces photorealistic rainy urban scenes, with high perceptual realism, which we validate qualitatively with an extensive user study and quantitatively. We produce the Cityscapes-CascadeRS dataset, to study downstream task performance under real rainy conditions. Our results establish CascadeRS as a scalable and realistic rain-generation framework for evaluating and enhancing the robustness of vision in adverse rainy weather. Code and dataset are available via https://github.com/nis-research/CascadeRainSynthesis

cs.CV

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.05586

Anduin: A sybil-resistant agentic marketplace reputation system

Reza Ramji, Preston Vander Vos, Ziming Zeng, Duc V. Le

原文摘要

As autonomous AI agents enter permissionless onchain markets, selecting new service providers remains a core challenge. Existing reputation systems depend on scarce resources like human curation, identity credentials, or voluntary reviews, while naive volume rankings are vulnerable to Sybil attacks. We evaluate whether existing onchain payment histories can yield provider ratings that are resilient against Sybil attacks. Using a 157-day dataset comprising 66M agentic transactions worth $6.1M across 16 blockchains, we model payment flows as a bipartite graph between buyers and providers. A provider's rating is derived from graph paths linked to a buyer's existing trusted network. We propose three Sybil-resistant rating algorithms: a max-flow rating and two relaxed algorithms optimized for stronger rating performance. Evaluating these algorithms against simulated adversaries across 813 buyers, we show that rating manipulation costs 20% of those buyers' total spend and is around 23x harder to manipulate than the standard similarity rule (collaborative filtering).

cs.AI