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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.10843

Agents of Chaos: A Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on Malicious Attacks on Agentic AI Systems

Thanh M. Truong-Le, Amber Bennoui, Hoang-Ly Nguyen, Gia-Thang Ho, Thai-Minh Truong, Duc-Ly Vu

原文摘要

Agentic AI systems extend large language models with tools, memory, retrieval, browser or computer-use interfaces, code execution, external services, and multi-agent coordination. Although these capabilities enable agents to act beyond text generation and perform tasks, they also create attack paths through which adversaries can exploit untrusted content, deceptive metadata, poisoned state, compromised skills, mutable dependencies, or malicious code. Such attacks can manipulate planning and tool use, corrupt memory, abuse code-execution environments, and trigger harmful downstream effects. In this paper, we present a systematic review of malicious attacks targeting agentic AI systems. We screened 186 candidate sources and retained 98. Following independent coding and resolver adjudication, we identified 284 atomic attacks, 452 atomic safeguards, and 660 explicit attack--safeguard relationships. We organize attacks into eight causal-mechanism classes while retaining insertion points, activation conditions, abused capabilities, objectives, impacts, persistence, and evidence as orthogonal dimensions. Our analysis shows that tool, MCP, and action-layer attacks account for the largest share of atomic attacks, while the prompt-injection and action-hijacking class has the broadest paper coverage. We identify distinct class-specific activation patterns and separation between insertion and later activation. Safeguard coverage remains uneven: only 278 of 660 relationships are directly assessed, and strong coverage is uncommon. These findings support lifecycle-aware threat modeling, agent evaluation, tool governance, and defense-in-depth security for agentic AI systems.

cs.CR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.10830

The Devil Wears Markdown: Detecting Malicious Intent Hidden in AI Agent Skill Instructions through Hybrid Static, Dynamic, and Agentic Analysis

Thanh M. Truong-Le, Amber Bennoui, Hoang-Ly Nguyen, Gia-Thang Ho, Thai-Minh Truong, Duc-Ly Vu

原文摘要

Agentic AI ecosystems increasingly rely on reusable agent skills that combine executable code, natural-language instructions, configuration artifacts, and external tool integrations. These hybrid artifacts create software supply-chain risks because malicious intent may be distributed across instructions, code, metadata, and runtime behavior, making isolated alerts difficult to interpret. We evaluate three open-source scanners on a held-out test set of 140 skills comprising 80 malicious and 60 benign samples, including Cisco Skill Scanner with and without its optional LLM analyzer. The default Cisco configuration achieves a recall of 0.91 with 33 false positives among the 60 benign skills, while the LLM-enabled configuration using Qwen3:8B achieves a recall of 0.85 with 40 false positives. We then present a framework that combines static findings, safety-constrained sandbox evidence, and LLM-based reasoning to assess malicious intent. The framework tracks the origins of findings and relates evidence across analysis layers. In a within-system evidence-source ablation using the same reasoning backend, adding dynamic evidence to skill-content reasoning increases F1 from 0.70 to 0.85. Combining static and dynamic evidence further increases F1 to 0.89, with five false positives among 60 benign skills. Dynamic evidence provides the largest observed improvement. The Full Pipeline detects 68 of 80 malicious skills, achieving 0.88 accuracy, 0.93 precision, and 0.85 recall. It matches the observed recall of Cisco Skill Scanner with LLM while reducing false positives from 40 to five. This system-level comparison does not isolate model or architecture effects.

cs.CR