跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail

论文库

检索计算机领域论文,按研究方向、作者或关键词筛选。

部分采集异常
正在读取账号与研究记录…

全站更新概况

+1112新增论文
+875其中 AI 相关
+133已有论文修订
+97新增 AI 导读

arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-20 06:44 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-19 19:09各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

统计 2026-11-19 06:56 — 2026-11-20 06:56(北京时间) · 点击数字查看对应简报;AI 相关包含在新增论文内。

最近完成检查:2026-11-20 06:44最近发现新增版本:2026-11-19 19:09库内论文最新更新时间:2026-11-19 02:59

每分钟刷新已保存的数据。空检查不代表采集异常;新收录可能包含历史论文。AI 导读按新增版本计数。

27,982 已收录论文23,249 AI 相关8,559 有修订112 HF 社区发现

浏览论文库

时间范围跟随排序:版本更新、本站收录或首次发表。最新收录可能包含历史论文。部分信源异常,查看状态 →

找到 1 篇论文 · 按版本更新时间排序上轮扫描起点 2026-11-20 06:42(北京时间)
版本更新 · v2arXiv:2610.38897

RARE: Response-Aware Rational Equilibrium in Budget-Constrained Pricing Games

Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Xin Huang, Eklavya Sharma

原文摘要

We study a pricing game in markets with budget-constrained buyers, where each seller offers a single good and sets its price. We consider both non-rivalrous goods, such as datasets, and rivalrous goods, such as physical goods. For non-rivalrous goods, each buyer chooses a utility-maximizing bundle within her budget. For rivalrous goods, an allocation rule selects a Pareto-optimal allocation subject to the buyers' budgets and the goods' supply constraints. Pure Nash equilibria often fail to exist in this game. A key reason is that Nash equilibrium assumes that the other sellers keep their prices fixed when one seller deviates. In practice, however, sellers harmed by a price change may respond, for example, by matching the new price. We propose a new equilibrium notion called Response-Aware Rational Equilibrium (RARE). At a RARE, every deviation by a seller can be deterred by a response from the other sellers, in which no responder earns less than she did right after the deviation. Every Nash equilibrium is a RARE. Assuming that the allocation rule is continuous in prices, we show that a RARE always exists for rivalrous goods, and for non-rivalrous goods when buyers have equal budgets. Moreover, the RARE that we construct extracts the buyers' entire budget. For non-rivalrous goods with unequal budgets, we show that an approximate RARE exists, where a deviating seller can increase her revenue by a factor equal to the ratio of the average budget to the minimum budget. We also study a natural dynamic in which sellers repeatedly raise their prices to earn the revenue that they could guarantee themselves by deviating. We show that, in the settings where we prove exact existence, this dynamic reaches a RARE with additive error $δ$ within $\lfloor B/δ\rfloor$ rounds, where $B$ is the buyers' total budget. This paper's main results have been formally verified in Lean 4.

cs.GT