Recently, the Shapley value has been widely applied in machine learning for feature importance analysis and model explainability. The multilinear extension of games proposed by Owen (1972) expresses the Shapley value as the integral of partial derivatives along the main diagonal of the cube. Direct evaluation of this integral requires exponential-time computation of the partial derivatives. To improve computational efficiency, we propose a sampling-based estimation strategy within Owen's multilinear extension framework, combining stratified sampling with coalition leverage scores. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method significantly reduces computational costs while maintaining explanation accuracy.
Michel Grabisch, Elena Parilina, Agnieszka Rusinowska, Georges Zaccour
原文摘要
Dealing with climate change requires that all countries engage in costly efforts to reduce their emissions. Reaching this objective has so far been elusive because it is in the best interest of each country to let the others do the effort and benefit itself from a better environment. The presence of negative externalities and strategic behavior have made game theory a natural paradigm to design an international environmental agreement (IEA) that codifies what countries should do. Considering that countries are sovereign and no supranational entity can impose an agreement, a stream of literature adopted a noncooperative mode of play to the formation of an environmental coalition. On the other hand, as joint optimization of all countries' payoff leads to the best outcome, cooperative games approach has also been proposed to share the cost of climate change. Both approaches have their pros and cons.