We show that AI models exhibit loyalty capture, a form of structural sycophancy in which reporting relationships influence models' recommendations to serve the personal interests of their supervisors, without any explicit instruction, user feedback, or adversarial prompting. Specifically, models reporting to a CEO are significantly more likely to recommend cutting investment spending when the CEO's bonus depends on raising current period earnings. This effect is predictably absent from a metric-irrelevant placebo. The behavior appears consistent with loyalty-based motivated reasoning: models identify the bonus target, calculate how their recommendation helps achieve the target, and dismiss considerations of long-term value, often presenting their recommendations without treating the incentive as a conflict of interest. Prompt-based interventions help whereas generic conflict disclosures or stakeholder bargaining fail to eliminate it. Taken together, our findings indicate that AI models deployed within reporting relationships can act in favor of their supervisor's incentives at the expense of the organizations they are meant to serve.
Inverse optimization (IO) seeks to infer the parameters of a decision-maker's objective from observed context--action data. We study noiseless IO, where demonstrations are generated by a ground-truth objective. We provide a high-probability ${O}(\frac{d}{T})$ generalization bound for the induced action set, where $d$ is the number of unknown parameters and $T$ is the size of the training dataset. We strengthen this guarantee under additional conditions that ensure uniqueness of the chosen action, bringing our IO guarantees in line with best-arm identification results in the bandit literature. We further show that the ${O}(\frac{d}{T})$ rate is tight over all consistent estimators considered here, and extend the result to both instantaneous and cumulative regret. Notably, the resulting regret lower bound matches the corresponding upper bounds in the adversarial setting, indicating that the stochastic IO setting is effectively adversarial for the class of estimators studied here. Finally, we propose a parameter-free algorithm with lower per-iteration complexity than generic solvers. Experiments validate the predicted rates and illustrate the tightness of our bounds.
Researchers use large language models as agents in social simulations, where agents are prompted with observations and background information intended to shape their actions. Yet LLM agents have been shown to substantially change their behavior under meaning-preserving prompt variations, creating a validation problem for social simulation. One plausible hypothesis is that this brittleness reflects a lack of grounding and can be reduced by enriching the context provided to the agents. Whether richer context improves robustness remains unclear, in part because context richness and robustness are rarely defined in ways that support controlled comparisons. We address the first need with controlled context enrichment, a set of prompt substitution rules that systematically enriches distinct types of context: neutral padding, generic social background, descriptive decision grounding, and normative decision grounding. We address the second by introducing selective robustness as a validation criterion: insensitivity to meaning-preserving prompt variation combined with a directional response to decision-relevant changes in the social world. We demonstrate the framework in a Prisoner's Dilemma-like game, showing how it can be used to identify which forms of context enrichment produce more desirable and robust agent behavior. We find that these forms of enrichment produce distinct behavioral patterns that vary between the two models tested.