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新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.39837

SHPRR: An Algorithm for Pure Exploration under Constrained Regret

Georgina Nouli, Flore Sentenac, Maximilian Schiffer

原文摘要

Best Arm Identification (BAI) conventionally measures the cost of experimentation by the number of samples collected. In many operational settings, however, the cost of exploration relative to a trusted baseline already in place is equally important. We study BAI under both a fixed sampling horizon and a regret budget. Unlike generic resources considered in constrained pure exploration, regret has a distinctive structure: sampling better arms is less costly relative to the baseline. We theoretically show that the regret cost of exploration decreases across the phases of Sequential Halving, a widely used pure-exploration algorithm. This observation yields improved guarantees on the probability of identifying the best arm and motivates a more effective allocation of the regret budget. We propose Sequential Halving with Proportional Regret Rationing (SHPRR), which front-loads the regret budget to allow more exploration when many arms remain. Experiments on synthetic and real-world instances show that SHPRR improves best-arm identification performance over uniform regret allocation and existing baselines.

cs.LG · cs.AI

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.36744

When do token systems stabilize? Compatibility constraints and community structure

Flore Sentenac, Mingwei Yang, Sophie H. Yu

原文摘要

Token systems support repeated service exchange without monetary transfers, but their viability depends on the stability of token balances. We study token systems with compatibility constraints among agents. A requester is randomly sampled in each period, and only a few randomly sampled agents are available to provide service. We establish a necessary and sufficient condition for stability and show that the minimum-token rule, which selects the available provider with the lowest token balance, achieves the optimal stability region. We then apply this stability criterion to a random token system generated from stochastic block models with uniformly sampled requesters. We tightly characterize the stability regime by identifying two obstructions to stability: insufficient service opportunities for a group of communities or for an individual agent.

cs.GT · math.PR