Execution traces help diagnose AI-agent failures, but sharing them can expose customer identities. For example, detecting that an agent handled the wrong customer's records requires knowing whether the records belong to the requested customer, but not necessarily knowing who that customer is. Our executable benchmark measures what a trace export reveals and whether a proposed repair restores the correct output in synthetic multi-tenant workflows. Conventional redaction can remove evidence needed for repair while leaving encoded identifiers recoverable. Two exports preserve ownership comparisons by reporting the match as a comparison fact or by using pseudonyms consistent within each execution. Both preserve the original diagnostic program's repairs. The tested identifier matchers identify no requested customer from either export. An independently written program produces correct outputs on 39 of 42 faulty cases with comparison facts and on all 42 with execution-scoped pseudonyms. Row counts still expose identities. With prior knowledge of customers' row counts, an attacker uniquely identifies the requested customer in 97 of 240 executions under each of the 15 export policies. Removing selected counters from the comparison-fact export stops this attack and preserves the original program's repairs. The benchmark lets engineers test what their diagnostic program can repair and what an attacker can still infer from the same export.
Privacy controls can prevent an evaluator from linking purchases to the recommendations users received, while a merchant can still release complete item-level purchase counts for the evaluation cohort. We ask when these counts identify which recommender performs better. The counts constrain who could have bought each item. We bound the performance difference over all assignments consistent with the counts. A reduced transportation network handles full catalogs and can certify attainable endpoints. If the interval excludes zero, it identifies the better recommender for that cohort. With differentially private counts, one confidence guarantee applies jointly to all comparisons from the same release. In two e-commerce cohorts of about 20,000 and 100,000 users, exact counts narrowed every interval compared with bounds that ignored the counts. Most decisions involved a recommender that favors popular items. For NDCG@10, which rewards ranking purchased items higher, each setting combined one of three personalized pairs with a pattern and rate of missing links. Exact counts settled 14 of 168 settings in the smaller cohort and none of 81 in the larger cohort. In the smaller cohort, exact counts broken down by user group settled two personalized pairs when 90% of users remained linked, at the cost of revealing more about individual purchases. Whole-cohort private releases with one count per item retained much of the narrowing but settled no personalized pair in either cohort. Grouping less popular items into bins let private counts settle one personalized pair in the smaller cohort.