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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.10558

A Cooperative Game Theoretic Model for Sustainable, Smallholder Carbon Farming

Geetha Charan, Thandava Sunkara, Rohit P Suresh, V. Priyanka, Manojkumar Patil, Kodur Sai Vinay Sathvik, Y. Narahari

原文摘要

Carbon farming offers a promising path to improve farmer livelihoods, mitigate climate change, and make farming sustainable. However, smallholder farmers, who dominate agriculture in developing economies, face structural barriers to participating in carbon farming due to high certification costs, limited landholdings, and limited budgets available to them. In this paper, we develop a cooperative game-theoretic framework to study how coalition formation can enable viable and profitable participation of smallholder farmers in carbon farming. Our approach explores three components: (i) Solo Portfolio Optimization (SPO), which determines an optimal portfolio of carbon farming practices that individual farmers can adopt under budget constraints; (ii) Joint Portfolio Optimization (JPO), which computes the maximum total economic surplus achievable through the formation of farmer coalitions; and (iii) surplus allocation among participating farmers in a principled way using cooperative game-theoretic solution concepts, such as Shapley value, core, least core, and nucleolus. We show that the underlying cooperative game is superadditive under an affordability condition and non-convex in general. As part of this study, we release CarbonFARM-Bench, a carbon farming dataset constructed by experts, and conduct controlled computational experiments on this dataset. We observe that solo participation in carbon farming is largely infeasible for smallholder farmers under baseline parameters, whereas coalition formation creates substantial value driven by economies of scale. In addition, we demonstrate that stability-aware allocation mechanisms are required for sustaining cooperation. Together, our results highlight that enabling smallholder carbon farming is fundamentally a challenge of institutional design, and we offer several policy recommendations to make it attractive to smallholder farmers.

cs.GT