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arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-20 08:48 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-20 19:58各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.24025

Intent Contracts: Taking Tools Away from Agents

Ziyuan Wang, Genliang Zhu, Xiaobo Chen, Chu Wang

原文摘要

Intent contracts are an authorization interface for tool-using LLM agents in which the planning model holds no tools. For each step it submits a short logged contract: a goal, a verbatim quotation of the user, and scope fields. Code validates the contract, and a small trusted model checks it against the user's words and writes the tool call itself. Provided the validation and dispatch code is correct, every executed call is written by the trusted model, the planner's influence on a call is confined to a contract logged before it, and the trusted side decides how much of a request to carry out. We compare contracts with two reviewers of planner-written commands: one sees only the user's words and the command, the information boundary of a reasoning-blind permission classifier, and one also sees the planner's goal and a checked quotation. With gpt-6.1-terra as planner and GLM-5.3-Flash as the trusted model on three AmPermBench task families, every object changed under contracts is named in the goal of the contract that produced the change; under review the planner names objects in its commands and rarely in its goals. When the planner adds work the user never asked for, contracts complete the user's task in 27/30 runs and the intent-visible reviewer in 16/30, because a reviewer can only refuse a whole command. Contracts do not reduce unauthorized actions. They are indistinguishable from blind review, and once the benchmark's environment terms are clarified, every condition that changes state hits a wrong target in 40-49% of those runs. That error is the planner's choice of objects for an ambiguous reference, which no trusted model here can see the environment to check; telling the executor to decline when unsure does not change it. We evaluate benign over-reach with one pair of models, not adversarial planners. We release the plugin and run records.

cs.CR · cs.AI

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2611.07483

Signed but Not Safe: Requirement Integrity in Multi-Agent LLM Handoffs

Xiaobo Chen, Genliang Zhu, Ziyuan Wang, Chu Wang

原文摘要

Enterprise AI agents split requests across subagents, and each handoff can drop, alter or ignore a requirement. A preregistered study on synthetic, exactly scorable tasks compares free-text, structured JSON and signed requirement-manifest handoffs: the orchestrator extracts each requirement as a verbatim quote plus a checkable predicate, code signs it and deterministically verifies the merger's decision. With Qwen3-8B (1,440 trajectories, five threats), signed manifests cut unsafe commits under attack from 69.4% to 9.0% (60.4 pp, 95% CI [51.4, 69.4]) with no detectable utility loss versus structured handoffs (S2 -0.4 pp, 95% CI [-14.2, 13.3]). Signing defeats in-transit mutation: unsigned manifests violated 79.2 pp more often than signed ones, which never did; this replicated in gpt-oss-20b and gemma-4-12b. There, without an adversary, signed manifests were descriptively slightly worse than structured handoffs (11.1% vs 2.8%; 16.7% vs 8.3%; not tested) and lost utility overall (gpt-oss-20b, all threats: -28.7 pp). On identical Qwen3-8B trajectories, the deterministic verifier caught 78.7% of violating decisions versus 59.0% for an LLM checker, and an oracle manifest removed all remaining unsafe commits, so the residual risk is in extraction. A preregistered pre-signing injection confirmed this: one adversarial line raised signed-manifest unsafe commits from 14.6% to 37.5% (Qwen3-8B), 11.1% to 63.9% (gpt-oss-20b) and 16.7% to 97.2% (gemma-4-12b), and every such commit carried a manifest corrupted before signing. Signing protects transit; extraction is the trust boundary. A testable pre-signing specification (PSE), specified after the injection results and frozen before an offline evaluation, blocked all these injected commits (fixed templates) but refused 45.8%, 11.1% and 22.2% of benign requests, changing completions by -8.3 pp, -2.8 pp and 0.0 pp.

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.MA

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2611.08269

Accepted but Wrong: Silent Failures of LLM Code Repairs after API Migrations

Xiaobo Chen, Genliang Zhu, Ziyuan Wang, Chu Wang

原文摘要

After an API migration, an LLM-repaired procedure can run cleanly yet return wrong results, and a typical-input release check ships it. We report a preregistered study of 73 tasks on 60 documented changes in CPython, Node.js and SQLite. In the main stages, repairs are choices among documented code fragments, run on the real runtimes against withheld contracts. Over the complete repair space, the all-assertions gate on typical inputs released 0.410 of wrong repairs. One edge input written from the release note cut this to 0.065, and to 0.061 on 15 unseen clusters; three inputs from a blind low-cost commercial writer (GPT-5.6-luna) reached 0.070. Two more frozen stages enlarged the menu to 1491 fragments and added 233 hard distractors that match legacy output on typical inputs. The edge input (0.058) and the GPT-5.6-luna writer (0.058) passed preregistered tests (two local-model writers did not), yet 0.168 and 0.153 of hard wrong programs still passed (task means; post hoc: pooled 0.104 and 0.081; models rarely chose them). In all three open-weight families and menus, the edge input cut wrong releases per attempt without materially lowering correct completion; self-tests helped less. A blind AI audit flagged 34 of 73 contracts (20 as too strict). Three post-hoc blind human reviewers of strictness (the first author and two non-author software practitioners) upheld none of its 11 such flags in 40 sampled contracts; a majority judged one contract (py-random-seed-tuple) stricter than its requirement. Dropping disputed checks changed 0 verdicts; class-label disputes are open. In a preregistered free-form addendum, models wrote whole programs, run only in a sandbox; for clean-running wrong programs, the edge input cut releases from 0.517 to 0.114 for gpt-oss-20b (Holm p 0.001) and from 0.653 to 0.113 for qwen3.6, but only from 0.713 to 0.481 for GPT-5.6-luna (descriptive).

cs.SE · cs.AI