跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail

论文库

检索计算机领域论文,按研究方向、作者或关键词筛选。

部分采集异常
正在读取账号与研究记录…

全站更新概况

+0新增论文
+0其中 AI 相关
+2已有论文修订
+100新增 AI 导读

arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-15 02:35 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-14 15:09各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

统计 2026-11-14 02:51 — 2026-11-15 02:51(北京时间) · 点击数字查看对应简报;AI 相关包含在新增论文内。

最近完成检查:2026-11-15 02:35最近发现新增版本:2026-11-14 15:09库内论文最新更新时间:2026-11-13 02:59

每分钟刷新已保存的数据。空检查不代表采集异常;新收录可能包含历史论文。AI 导读按新增版本计数。

23,348 已收录论文19,580 AI 相关6,729 有修订112 HF 社区发现

浏览论文库

时间范围跟随排序:版本更新、本站收录或首次发表。最新收录可能包含历史论文。部分信源异常,查看状态 →

找到 2 篇论文 · 按版本更新时间排序上轮扫描起点 2026-11-15 02:34(北京时间)
新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.15433

Verifier Choice is a Benchmark Design Variable: Auditing Structural Counting Evaluation in Text-to-Image Models

Shurun Li, Michael Hua Wang, Haibo Zeng, Long Wang

原文摘要

Automatic evaluation is now central to text-to-image benchmarking, but the verifier that converts generated images into scores is often treated as an implementation detail. We argue that this is unsafe: an automatic benchmark score is a property of the image generator, prompt distribution, verifier, verifier-use protocol, and scoring rule, not of the generator alone. We study this issue in structural counting, a controlled setting where human-visible counts can be audited. We construct a verifier-centric audit suite over seven counting objects: cell phones, chairs, and traffic lights for object counting, and clover leaflets, dresser drawer fronts, power-strip sockets, and turbine blades for substructure counting. Across 6,240 generated images from Qwen-Image-2512 and FLUX.2-dev, we compare open MLLM verifiers under count-only, reject-aware, zero-shot and few-shot protocols, plus TIFA-like target queries, a detector baseline, and frontier closed-model checks on two hard objects. On a balanced 2,280-image evaluation split, aggregate score matching can coexist with image-level disagreement, and verifier-use protocols and generator distributions change the measured reliability. Every verifier-protocol configuration also shrinks the human score difference between the two generators, by 7.5-25.0 pp, and with a third generator, Z-Image, all four tested protocols reverse the human ordering of Z-Image and FLUX.2-dev on our fixed prompt suite. GPT-5.5 and Claude Opus 4.7 checks do not remove the failure modes: GPT-5.5 still has only 59.92% clover valid-count fidelity, while Claude Opus 4.7 has lower same-slice agreement ($κ=0.432$). We propose reporting automatic benchmark scores with a factorized verifier reliability profile: aggregate score gap, image-level agreement, generator-comparison distortion, valid-image count fidelity, rejection behavior, output compliance, and directional bias.

cs.CV · cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.35716

Audit Where Hacks Pay: Budgeted Strong-Verifier Audits Against Reward Hacking in GRPO

Shurun Li, Michael Hua Wang, Haibo Zeng, Long Wang

原文摘要

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards trains on cheap checks, such as unit tests, that a policy can learn to game, while a stronger check is too expensive to run on every rollout. We study how to spend a limited strong-verifier budget in GRPO, separating which weakly passing rollouts to audit from what reward a caught hack receives. At a fixed policy state with centered advantages, the expected update depends on a design only through each rollout's marginal audit probability and correction; reflecting a caught hack's reward about the failure reward negates the advantages of an all-hack group; and auditing whole groups with the fewest weak passes first (low-pass budgeted audits, LB) minimizes the advantage mass left on hacks among pass-count designs with a fixed correction when a label's value falls with the pass count. We tested this analysis in actual LLM training: from each run's starting state, the sign of this mass on a frozen panel predicted whether hacking would be suppressed in 33 of 39 runs, including 13 of 16 preregistered ones. In LeetCode (Wong et al., 2026) and Countdown-Code (Khalifa et al., 2026), LB drives hacking to near zero, while random audits with the same penalty and budget do not and use more labels. We also find that the randomness of the update affects training: in Countdown-Code, two unbiased corrections, per-item reward-level IPW and a group-level advantage correction, bring hacking down too but end 6.1-11.8 and 8.0-11.5 points lower in held-out accuracy than LB at the same budget. A full audit, which the group-level correction reproduces in expectation, stays within about two points of LB in three seeds, while LB uses 28% of its labels, and allocating the same correction by pass count recovers most of the loss (one seed). Training outcomes thus depend not only on the expected update but also on the randomness of its estimate.

cs.LG · cs.AI