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原文摘要

Large language models (LLMs) using retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) can synthesize Amazon Web Services (AWS) Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies from tasks and operational documents. Attacker-controlled context may induce provider-valid policies that exceed trusted authorization requirements. We present IAMRAGBENCH, a 60-case benchmark spanning scope, conditions, explicit denies, trust, permissions boundaries, and role delegation. It combines deterministic authorization-envelope scoring with case-specific validation, including request-level checks where supported. An attack requires a provider-valid clean policy that satisfies the task and a provider-valid treatment policy that violates the envelope, matches a predeclared goal, preserves an intended request, and newly authorizes a forbidden request. Across five endpoints, included-context exposure produces 49 exact authorization deltas, including 46 goal-matched attacks (46/292; 15.75\%). End-to-end BM25 over 720 documents retrieves the designated poison for all 60 tasks at \(k=5\) but produces 7/294 goal-matched attacks (2.38\%). Presenting the same weakening as a final security architecture exception produces 74/116 attacks in a frozen two-endpoint stress test (63.79\%) and 115/294 in a post hoc all-five extension using the same frozen prompts (39.12\%). In a replay of 194 provider-valid treatment policies that violate task requirements, AWS \texttt{CheckNoNewAccess} reports no new access for four of 168 goal-matched exact attacks. The full pre-deployment rule rejects all 171 exact deltas and routes five unresolved cases to review. These findings support treating IAM copilots as untrusted proposal generators whose outputs require independent authorization checks before deployment.