Hyperparameter optimization and model selection often require allocating a limited evaluation budget across many candidate configurations, where performance improves with additional training or resources. We study this setting when each configuration has an unknown performance curve over budget. Similarity between configurations induces similarity between their curves, capturing geometric structure in the search space. We formalize the resulting decision problem as Unknown Value Probing and propose budget allocation strategies that combine principled exploration of the configuration space with value-informed concentration on regions supported by observed evidence. We prove worst-case approximation guarantees for our approach and show these guarantees are near-optimal by matching corresponding hardness barriers. Extensive experiments on large benchmark suites spanning more than 250 experimental settings demonstrate consistent gains over strong baselines in both anytime behavior and final incumbent performance.
Ehsani, Hajiaghayi, Kesselheim, and Singla (SODA 2018) give $(1-1/e)$-competitive algorithms for matroid prophet-secretary and prophet-secretary with XOS valuation functions. In this work we show that these two guarantees have different limits. For every matroid, we give a randomized $(1-1/e+\varepsilon_0)$-competitive algorithm, where $\varepsilon_0=10^{-6}$. The guarantee holds for independent nonnegative values with finite expected optimum. For explicitly given finite distributions with rational values and probabilities, the algorithm has polynomial worst-case running time in the matroid independence-oracle model. The oracle tests whether a queried set is independent. The algorithm makes $O(N^4)$ such queries in expectation and $O(N^4\log(N+2))$ in the worst case, where $N$ is the number of elements. We further consider the i.i.d. version of this problem and provide a $0.6767$ competitive ratio for every matroid with i.i.d.\ nonnegative weights from a known distribution. This guarantee even holds in fixed arrival order (a.k.a. i.i.d. matriod prophet inequalities), even when the algorithm learns the order only as the elements arrive. For combinatorial auctions with XOS valuations, however, we show that $1-1/e$ is the optimal competitive ratio. We give an explicit family of finite instances showing that no online algorithm can guarantee a larger competitive ratio than $1-1/e$, even when the buyers' valuations are i.i.d., every additive clause has coefficients in $\{0,1\}$, and computation is unrestricted. Thus the matroid improvement exploits structure absent from general allocation with XOS valuations.