ChronoPatch: Black-Box Energy-Latency Attacks on Vision-Language Models
Jiawei Xing, Li Wang, Xiangtao Meng, Chuanchao Zang, Rui Wen, Zheng Li
原文摘要
Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as generative inference services, where autoregressive decoding makes response length a key determinant of latency and computational cost. This creates an availability risk: adversarial visual inputs can prolong generation and increase serving overhead. Existing energy-latency attacks typically rely on gradients, logits, or token-level feedback, leaving open whether such risks persist when an attacker observes only the final response. We present ChronoPatch, a black-box attack that induces prolonged VLM generation requiring only the final response. It discovers visual delay anchors through response-length-guided evolutionary search, then minimizes perturbation magnitude through subspace-calibrated decision-based optimization. Across four open-source VLMs, ChronoPatch increases inference latency by 47.86%--293.34% and GPU energy consumption by 41.44%--249.70% under a 5% spatial budget. It also induces more repetitive outputs, as reflected by increased n-gram repetition ratios. On three commercial VLM APIs, ChronoPatch increases response length by 37.6%--81.5% and client-observed latency by 1.82x--2.29x under query budgets of 500 per API. These results reveal a generation-based availability risk that persists under final-response-only access and motivate generation-aware safeguards for deployed generative AI services.
cs.CR · cs.AI