TetherMark: Instance-Level Watermark Authentication Against Cross-Instance Transplantation
Jin Wei, Rundong Li, Li Ma, Yikai Wang, Ruihao Yang, Jianxiong Wu, Xiaoyuan Duan, Yanbo Wang 等 14 位作者
原文摘要
Robust watermarking is commonly verified by asking whether a hidden payload remains decodable after compression, geometric distortion, or generative editing. Localized and semantic extensions may additionally check whether an expected region or category is still present. These tests establish evidence validity or content consistency, but not whether the evidence still belongs to the particular visual instance registered by its owner. We expose cross-instance transplantation: an attacker extracts or estimates valid watermark evidence from one registered image and transfers it to a different image of the same category. The message can still decode, the expected content can remain present, and the result can look natural, even though the evidence has been reassigned to the wrong instance. To enable instance-level watermark authentication, we introduce TetherMark, a post-hoc watermark that combines two complementary checks. The message check verifies an edit-robust payload, while the relation check uses secret patch-pair selection, a registered response, natural correspondence transport, and enrollment normalization to test consistency with the registered instance. The verifier accepts only when both checks pass. Across 240 test subjects, TetherMark attains 92.08% legitimate true acceptance with 9.17% and 16.25% attack success under WmForger and WMCopier, respectively, yielding the highest instance-binding balanced accuracy under both attacks.
cs.CR · cs.CV