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版本更新 · v3arXiv:2610.05335

Soundness of the GKR Protocol for Sparse-Merkle Updates, with a Machine-Checked Core

Jinwook Kim

原文摘要

The GKR soundness theorem bounds the acceptance of a false output claim for a fixed circuit and input. It does not say what the outputs of a compiled circuit mean for that input, and that has to be proved for each family of circuits. For a sparse Merkle tree over a compressing hash, heuristically almost every root admits a valid path for almost any leaf, so the needed statement concerns the witness as well as the claim. We prove per-input soundness for membership, non-membership and update claims, for trees of every depth, in the delegation setting of GKR: the verifier reads the circuit input in the clear and leaves the node hashes to the circuit. Assuming correct hash sub-circuits, every accepted input, honestly encoded or not, determines a valid witness, and the chain constraint cannot be dropped. If the witness read from an input fixed before the challenges is not valid, this verifier accepts with probability at most $\bigl(s_{\mathrm{out}}+\sum_i(8s_i+1)\bigr)/|\mathbb{F}|$ for a circuit with $2^{s_{\mathrm{out}}}$ outputs and $2^{s_i}$ wires read at layer $i$. This covers cube gates for the Poseidon2 S-box and, with $|\mathbb{F}| = p^4$, circuits over the 31-bit KoalaBear field with challenges from its quartic extension. The implemented node hash, a truncated permutation, is not collision resistant, so the statement that accepted runs for one key and root assert the same leaf assumes position binding of the tree. All our results are proved in the paper. Isabelle/HOL also checks a layer-chain bound, the exactness of the verifier's checks on encoded witnesses in a constraint-level model with abstract hash sub-circuits and, over one field, their composition for claims with no valid witness. All bounds concern the interactive public-coin protocol.

cs.CR · cs.LO

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2610.14849

StateSync-GKR: Design and Evaluation of a Reusable Sparse GKR Engine

Jinwook Kim

原文摘要

Authenticated state transitions need proof engines that conserve memory, avoid repeated setup, keep every result bound to its request under parallel execution and return complete proofs at service rates. We present StateSync-GKR, a reusable Rust sumcheck/GKR core with a sparse-Merkle frontend, and evaluate release 1.2.0 against release 1.1 measured on the same day on the same instance types, request corpus and latency budgets. Sparse layer reduction keeps additional requested allocation 3,242-fold and peak process memory about 89-fold below the engine's dense reference at width 4,096. Release 1.2 changes two parts of the software while proof bytes and verifier acceptance stay fixed: reorganized round arithmetic raises prepared proving throughput 2.4 to 2.7-fold on a 192-core bare-metal host, and a new serving path starts each job as soon as a worker is free, bounds queued work and buffered replies, and returns proofs in completion order bound to request identifiers. On a 192-core VM at 1,000 requests/s, 99th-percentile latency to verified acceptance falls from 440 to 34 ms. One connection carries 3,300 requests/s with every request inside one second, confirmed in three 60-second runs and a 30-minute run of 5.94 million requests without a latency or queue trend; at 3,400 requests/s reply traffic reaches the provider's documented 5-Gbit/s single-flow limit, and two connections passed 5,000 requests/s in 15-second screens. In single 15-second screens on 48 cores, the highest passing rate rose from 500 to 2,000/s. Offered 1.5 times its highest screened one-connection rate under a memory limit, with excess offers held back by the client, the worker held its resident memory near a fifth of that limit and left no submitted request unresolved. For an integrating service, fewer servers deliver the same proof rate with bounded tail latency, and existing verifiers accept the GKR proofs unchanged.

cs.CR · cs.PF