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arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-18 04:28 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-17 23:35各信源进度 →

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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.21533

中国电力数据资产的激励对齐:区块链赋能的贡献信用框架

Incentive Alignment for Electricity Data Assets in China: A Blockchain-Enabled Contribution-Credit Framework

Jiazheng Zhang, Shouwei Li, Yutian Deng, Wei Wei, John Cartlidge

AI 速读 基于摘要

提出区块链赋能的贡献信用框架,利用延迟证据、动态信用、托管和报告关联惩罚促进电力市场中真实报告贡献并实现激励分配。

cs.CY · cs.DC

查看原文摘要

Modern electricity markets increasingly rely on reported operational contributions to allocate incentives, recognise cooperation, and coordinate activities across multiple organisations. However, supporting evidence for many reported contributions becomes available only after subsequent metering, dispatch, settlement, or auditing processes, making it difficult to reward genuine contributions while discouraging strategic over-reporting. Existing approaches largely address data sharing, performance verification, blockchain record management, or incentive allocation in isolation, providing limited support for integrating delayed evidence into a unified incentive mechanism. This paper proposes a blockchain-enabled contribution-credit framework for truthful reporting under delayed evidence. The framework links authenticated evidence to contribution recognition through dynamic credit updating, escrow, report-linked penalties, and automated incentive execution. Developed using the Chinese electricity market as the primary setting, it is demonstrated through two representative coordination scenarios, with adaptations illustrating its applicability to UK and US electricity-market structures. A controlled heterogeneous-agent simulation evaluates the behavioural effects of the proposed mechanism, while security analysis, public-data workflow analysis, and blockchain implementation experiments assess its practical feasibility. The results show that integrating delayed evidence with dynamic credit, escrow, and report-linked penalties promotes truthful reporting while providing a transparent and auditable process for translating verified operational contributions into incentive allocation. The proposed framework offers a practical mechanism for improving accountability, coordination, and incentive compatibility in collaborative electricity markets.

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2510.20454

Capturing Intransitive Dominance in Tennis Forecasting: A Graph Neural Network Approach

Lawrence Clegg, John Cartlidge

原文摘要

Intransitive player dominance, where player A beats B, B beats C, but C beats A, is common in competitive tennis. Yet, there are few known attempts to incorporate it within forecasting methods. We address this problem with a graph neural network approach that explicitly models these intransitive relationships through temporal directed graphs, with players as nodes and their historical match outcomes as directed edges. Our model (65.7% accuracy, 0.214 Brier score) forecasts competitively with established rating systems such as Weighted Elo. Although it does not improve on the baseline in unconditional accuracy, a forecast-encompassing test shows that it carries complementary information. A combined forecast significantly outperforms Weighted Elo, and there is some indication that the gain is larger on the intransitive matchups our model targets. A graph-based representation of player interactions thus captures a forecasting signal that transitive rating systems discard, even between players who share no common opponents.

cs.LG

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2605.24490

Market Regime Council for Dynamic Credit Assignment in Multi-Agent LLM Decision Systems

Yunhua Pei, Zerui Ge, Jin Zheng, John Cartlidge

原文摘要

Multi-agent LLM decision systems for portfolio management still lack a principled way to assign credit across specialist agents, remain vulnerable to cold-start dominance under regime shifts, and offer limited transparency into how final allocations are formed. We propose Market Regime Council (MRC), an online credit-assignment mechanism over coalitions of specialist agents, with portfolio management as the downstream task. MRC computes exact Shapley credits across all single, pairwise, and Grand-coalition outputs for online agent weighting. Instantiated with N=3 specialist agents, at each trading period, MRC recomputes coalition-based Shapley weights from exponentially weighted performance histories, uses a Bayesian adaptive mixture to stabilize early periods, applies regime-dependent multipliers to adjust agent authority, and records each rebalance through a five-layer causal trace. Over 1,037 trading days across 13 crypto assets and five seeds, MRC achieves a Sharpe ratio of 1.51 and a cumulative return of 440.1%, ranking first on CR, SR, and IR among active baselines and attaining the lowest MDD among active methods. Ablation results show that the gains come from Shapley-weighted integration across coalition outputs rather than from any single stage in isolation. Code and demo data are available open source.

cs.AI · cs.LG · q-fin.PM

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2605.26074

StakeBench: Evaluating Language Understanding Grounded in Market Commitment

Yunhua Pei, Jingyu Hu, Yiwei Shi, Hongnan Ma, Weiru Liu, John Cartlidge

原文摘要

Existing financial NLP benchmarks often rely on labels supplied by outside observers, measuring how language is perceived rather than what speakers have committed to in the market. We introduce StakeBench, an evaluation framework for language understanding grounded in market commitment. StakeBench links 560,876 comments from 2,261 resolved markets to verified position, action, and market-odds records across Polymarket and Manifold. Supervision is derived from observable market behavior. Position sides, post-comment trading actions, and market-odds trajectories replace human annotation. Four diagnostic tasks test whether models detect market commitment, identify the revealed side, anticipate future action, and perform collective odds projection. Three commitment-aware metrics measure alignment with revealed preferences rather than perceived sentiment. Validity audits and explicit interpretation boundaries help distinguish observable commitment signals from latent belief and causal market-odds impact. Across 15 LLMs and 18 topics and platform settings, models partially recover position-side signals, with Directed Accuracy from 0.506 to 0.599, but show structural failures on later tasks. Ten of the fifteen models collapse to one or two action labels in future action anticipation, and no model consistently improves on the naive odds-direction baseline in collective odds projection. Model scale is not correlated with performance, finance-domain tuning does not improve revealed-side identification, and platform incentives strongly shape higher-order results. StakeBench is packaged with evaluation code and dataset under CC-BY 4.0.

cs.CL · cs.AI · q-fin.GN