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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2609.21439

People escalate against a competitor labelled human and hold back against one labelled an optimising machine

Vinicius Ferraz, Leon Houf

原文摘要

People increasingly compete against AI agents, and organisations decide what to tell them about these opponents. We distinguish an opponent effect, specific to the system faced, from an information effect, a property of the disclosure. In a preregistered, deception-free experiment (N = 1,395), we crossed what participants were told about their opponent with whom they faced in a live all-pay auction in which escalation arises from the incentives. Holding the opponent fixed, being told a human was or might be the opponent raised the median price by 6.7% of the prize value, and being told an optimising machine might be lowered it by 8.8%. Facing an AI agent lowered prices and made it rarer that both players finished with positive earnings. Exploratory analyses indicate that the labels changed how often people raised again while already ahead, not how often they responded when behind. Describing an AI competitor is not behaviourally neutral.

cs.HC · econ.GN