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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2602.06008

From Chats to Markets: AgenticPay for LLM-Powered Negotiation in Multi-Agent Commerce

Xianyang Liu, Shangding Gu, Fan Xu, Manxi Wu, Boyi Li, Jun Wang, Costas Spanos, Dawn Song

原文摘要

Large language model agents are increasingly expected to negotiate and transact autonomously, yet existing benchmarks rarely combine multimodal product grounding, multi-issue bargaining, and competitive multi-agent markets. We introduce AgenticPay, a unified benchmark for evaluating multimodal agents' ability to reach high-welfare, multidimensional agreements in realistic markets. AgenticPay includes 160 multimodal tasks across four business scenarios (E-commerce, Food Delivery, Ride-hailing, and Apartment Rental) and eight market topologies, from bilateral bargaining to many-to-many competition. Agents interpret product images, infer opponents' hidden preferences, and negotiate binding contract terms such as price, lease duration, return policy, and delivery speed through multi-round natural-language dialogue. A utility-based framework evaluates agreement quality and joint welfare. Experiments with proprietary (GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview) and open-weight (Qwen3-VL-32B-Instruct, InternVL3-38B) multimodal models reveal substantial limitations in value creation and market reasoning. Even the strongest model, Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview, achieves a GlobalScore of only 42.3/100. As markets shift from bilateral to multi-sided, average GlobalScore falls by 5.7 points, with open-weight models declining by up to 11.5 points. AgenticPay provides a testbed for evaluating multimodal agents in realistic commerce. Code and data: https://github.com/SAIL-Research-Lab/AgenticPay.

cs.AI · cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.36306

How Learning Selects Equilibria and When It Leads to Collusion

Hanzhang Wang, Manxi Wu

原文摘要

We study how learning algorithm design shapes equilibrium selection in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games with finite states and actions. Each episode, players choose smooth best responses to beliefs about opponents' policies, test them using noisy observations, and resample rejected beliefs or explore at rates determined by increasing transformations of their discounted values. We show that stochastically stable states induce approximate stationary Nash equilibria maximizing the minimum transformed discounted value across players, with transformations governing which players selection favors. In repeated games with bounded recall of noisy public signals, longer recall weakly increases the selected minimum transformed value. In repeated Cournot games, every stochastically stable state induces an approximate public perfect equilibrium whose minimum discounted profit across firms exceeds the Cournot-Nash benchmark. Collusion is therefore inevitable under these conditions and learning dynamics. For symmetric firms, selected profits can approach the monopoly benchmark arbitrarily closely. These results offer a novel equilibrium-selection perspective on algorithmic collusion.

cs.GT