Juel Hussain, Louise A. Dennis, Clare Dixon, Marie Farrell
原文摘要
Security-minded verification of autonomous and robotic systems presupposes an attacker, yet the path from a threat catalogue to a checkable attacker model is still traversed by hand. This research preview presents the theory and construction of a pipeline that mechanises it. Each leaf of an attack tree is mapped to a CAPEC attack pattern and written in first-order logic as a rule: the attacker's prerequisites imply the attack's effect. Casting the pattern as such a rule is what makes it operational - its variables can be bound to a specific system's parts, and its prerequisites can then be tested against that system under a chosen configuration of security controls. Binding is our means of verifying whether a system is vulnerable to a given attack: from a bound pattern we derive an attacker model, turn its effect into a temporal-logic property, and check that property against the system with and without a countermeasure, reporting the control that defeats the attack. We describe the signature, schemas, profiles for approach, and explore how CAPEC can support reasoning about robotics security.
Gunjari Chakraborty, Yasmin Rafiq, Hazel M. Taylor, Marie Farrell
原文摘要
Understanding requirements for systems involving humans and robots is essential for providing robust evidence that such systems behave correctly. Requirements formalisation approaches such as the Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET) can support the transition from unstructured natural language to formal representations suitable for verification. In this paper, we formalise 146 hazard-derived natural-language requirements for a Robot-Assisted Dressing (RAD) case study, previously classified using a taxonomy of Human-Robot Teamwork (HRT) requirements. Through an iterative process involving domain-expert clarification, these were represented by 117 unique FRETISH requirements. Formalisation exposed ambiguities, temporal and probabilistic assumptions, and cases where source requirements needed to be decomposed or could be consolidated because they expressed the same formal behaviour. Temporal analysis showed that 70.1% of the unique FRETISH requirements use either immediate-response or ordering constraints (immediately or before), while formalisation also exposed relationships between requirements across HRT taxonomy categories. We further analyse the formal semantics and realisability of the resulting requirements. The results show that HRT classification and formalisation provide complementary views: the taxonomy captures the teamwork concern represented by a requirement, while FRETISH makes the required behaviour explicit. We report practical lessons and limitations of applying FRET to HRT requirements and identify directions for further work.