Can the allocation used to train experts also predict which expert will perform best on a prompt? Such a connection would make the intended division of labor inspectable before training and allow the allocation itself to guide inference. We introduce InflEns, a mixture of LoRA experts whose training weights and inference routes come from the same location game in a fixed prompt-trait space. Players choose positions to maximize their expected shares of the prompt distribution, without using expert losses. We utilize the game's kernel-general theoretical criterion for when co-located positions become locally unstable to separation. We evaluate InflEns on a corpus assembled from seven safety-related benchmarks, which demonstrates that the highest-share expert has the lowest held-out response negative log-likelihood (NLL) on approximately 90% of prompts across four kernels under a sharpened simplex representation, compared with approximately 15% after permuting allocations across prompts. We demonstrate that the method performs comparably to published learned gates without having to train an explicit gate on the experts. Because the router is fixed, we can trace harmful behavior to a single expert and retrain only that expert, which lowers HarmBench attack success from 0.51 to 0.02 while keeping instruction following. The game also gives us several controls over how the experts specialize, including the kernel choice and its parameters, the trait-space geometry, and the number of experts. Importantly, InflEns is a general framework that can be extended to any encoder and data distribution.
Across domains as varied as ecology, economics, and online platforms, individuals are incentivized to position themselves within resource-rich strategy spaces. In this work we introduce a new spatial game framework called the influencer's game. Within this new framework players' strategies are represented as positions within a trait space. Players then receive a share of a portion of a resource based on their relative influence at that resource's points traits. For the influencer's game, we show that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium that exists under strict log-concavity of the influence kernel. Using the unique equilibrium we show that the stability of the system depends on the influence kernel's parameters, number of players, and the resource distribution shape. For any dimension we demonstrate a stability threshold that depends on both the scatter and curvature of the players. When this threshold is crossed, the symmetric equilibrium destabilizes and gives way to a variety of bifurcation types; including, specialist clusters, limit cycles, and sub-games that reproduce the larger game's structure. We ground these results using real-world data for resources as a demonstration of the game's application. Finally we extend the game dynamics to use multi-agent reinforcement learning and further show that the predicted bifurcation structure persists under partial observability and discretized strategy spaces. In all, the influencer's game provides a novel framework for predicting when competitive pressure drives convergence versus fragmentation with possible applications across domains.