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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.10619

On the Convergence of First-Order Methods in Signaling Games

Rilind Sahitaj, Artem Tsikiridis, Martin Bichler

原文摘要

We study first-order learning dynamics in Bayesian signaling games, a minimal extensive-form model of strategic interaction under asymmetric information. In these games, a Sender observes a private type and chooses a signal, after which a Receiver forms a posterior belief and selects an action. This Bayesian belief update makes the induced learning field fundamentally different from the affine game-gradient fields of normal-form games. Empirically, we find a sharp dichotomy: standard online learning algorithms reliably converge to strict Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PE), but not to non-strict ones. We show that this behavior cannot be explained by the global geometric conditions commonly used to prove last-iterate convergence, such as monotonicity or the Minty variational inequality. Indeed, these conditions can fail even in binary signaling games. Instead, we identify the relevant local geometry. Our main result characterizes variational stability in finite signaling games: a PE is variationally stable if and only if it is strict. This yields local last-iterate convergence guarantees for online mirror descent and regularized dual averaging near every strict PE. We then study global average-iterate convergence and identify a class of signaling games in which coarse-trigger regret-minimizing dynamics converge to the unique PE. Finally, we complement the theory with experiments comparing projected gradient ascent, mirror-based methods, optimistic variants, and PPO across canonical signaling-game families. The results position signaling games as a compact testbed for understanding how Bayesian belief formation reshapes the convergence geometry of multi-agent learning.

cs.GT

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.05221

Colonel Blotto 博弈中的高效均衡计算

Efficient Equilibrium Computation in Colonel Blotto Games

Martin Bichler, Abheek Ghosh

AI 速读 基于摘要

作者提出一个全多项式时间近似方案,用于计算经典连续版 Colonel Blotto 博弈的 ε-Nash 均衡。

cs.GT · cs.DS · econ.TH

查看原文摘要

Colonel Blotto is a fundamental resource-allocation game in which two players divide their budgets across battlefields, and the higher allocation on each battlefield wins its value. The problem of computing an equilibrium efficiently has remained unresolved for its classical continuous version with arbitrary budgets and with values that may vary across battlefields but are the same for both players. We give a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme that computes an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in time polynomial in the input length and $1/\varepsilon$, and nearly linear in the input length for fixed $\varepsilon$. For sufficiently balanced budgets and battlefield values, we also compute exact equilibria in linear time.

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.38487

Simultaneous Gradient Learning in First-Price Auctions

Janik Bürgermeister, Julius Durmann, Martin Bichler, Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Bary Pradelski, Marco Scarsini

原文摘要

We study equilibrium learning in discretized Bayesian games, focusing on first-price auctions as a testbed for gradient-based learning dynamics under private information. While the symmetric independent private values model admits a unique Bayesian correlated equilibrium (BCE) in the continuous limit, standard convergence guarantees for gradient-based learners do not apply: classical no-regret theory predicts convergence only to Bayesian coarse correlated equilibria (BCCE), which can remain large and far from the competitive equilibrium even under fine discretizations. To bridge this gap, we introduce the notion of Bayesian semicoarse correlated equilibrium (BSCCE), an equilibrium concept that refines BCCE by restricting deviations to probability-preserving transformations consistent with projected gradient dynamics. We provide a linear programming characterization of BSCCE with polynomially many variables and constraints and establish the inclusion hierarchy $BCE \subseteq BSCCE \subseteq BCCE$. Our main finding is that the BSCCE set contracts in many cases as the discretization of the Bayesian game is refined. Even with priors for which BCCE fails to concentrate, the diameter of the BSCCE polytope shrinks toward zero, indicating convergence to the unique continuous-game Bayes-Nash equilibrium. These results provide a principled explanation for the observed robustness of gradient-based learning in discretized Bayesian games, showing that these dynamics select a smaller equilibrium set than standard no-regret theory predicts.

cs.GT · econ.TH