Learning to profit from trade requires learning both sides of a market: what a seller is willing to accept and what a buyer is willing to pay. We study repeated bilateral trade, where an intermediary posts a purchase price to a seller and a sale price to a buyer whose valuations are drawn from an unknown joint distribution. Trade occurs only if both parties accept their respective prices, in which case the intermediary earns the difference between the two prices. The intermediary observes only whether trade occurs, without observing either valuation. We show that learning both sides of the market is no harder, in terms of regret, than learning just one. Specifically, we design an algorithm achieving regret $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ against the best fixed pair of prices, matching, up to logarithmic factors, the classical lower bound for one-dimensional dynamic pricing. Our result shows that the classical one-dimensional regret rate survives the transition to two dimensions, raising the question of whether this absence of a curse of dimensionality extends to arbitrarily high dimensions.
Kalana Kalupahana, Francesco Emanuele Stradi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi
原文摘要
We design the first regret guarantees for robust dynamic pricing that decouple the dependence on the corruption $C$ and the time horizon $T$. In dynamic pricing, a seller with unlimited supply of a good interacts with a stream of buyers over \( T \) rounds, with the goal of maximizing revenue. At each round $t$, the seller posts a price $p_t$, and the buyer purchases the good only if their unknown valuation $v^\star$ exceeds this price. The seller observes only the binary feedback $\mathbb{I} \left\{ p_t \leq v^\star \right\}$, indicating whether a sale occurred. In the \emph{robust} pricing setting, a malicious adversary is allowed to corrupt this feedback in at most $C$ rounds. Even if the learner knows the corruption $C$, the best known regret bound is $\mathcal{O}(C\log\log T)$ by Gupta et al. [2025]. This leaves as an open problem to ``decouple'' the dependence on $C$ and $T$. In this work, we resolve this open problem. In particular, we develop a robust variant of binary search that achieves regret $\mathcal{O}(C+\log T)$ when the corruption $C$ is known and $\mathcal{O}(C+\log^2 T)$ when the corruption is unknown.
We study robust repeated contextual pricing, where valuations depend linearly on the features. At each round $t\in[T]$, a seller observes a context, posts a price, and receives only a possibly corrupted binary sale feedback. When the seller knows an upper bound $C$ on the number of corrupted rounds, we design an algorithm with regret $\mathcal O(Cd+d^2\log T)$, where $d$ is the context dimension. This is the first guarantee for robust contextual pricing that separates the dependence on the corruption budget $C$ from the horizon $T$, closing the problem left open by Gupta, Guruganesh, Paes Leme, and Schneider (2025). In this work, we go even further by developing a randomized algorithm that attains regret of order $\mathcal{O}(Cd+d^2\log T+d\log^2T)$ with high probability, without knowing the number of corrupted rounds $C$. Finally, we show that randomized algorithms that do not know $C$ cannot guarantee regret of order $\mathcal{O}(C)+o(\log^2 T)$ with high probability, even in the one dimensional non-contextual case.