跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail

论文库

检索计算机领域论文,按研究方向、作者或关键词筛选。

部分采集异常
正在读取账号与研究记录…

全站更新概况

+1680新增论文
+1333其中 AI 相关
+187已有论文修订
+59新增 AI 导读

arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-18 04:28 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-17 23:35各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

统计 2026-11-17 09:15 — 2026-11-18 09:15(北京时间) · 点击数字查看对应简报;AI 相关包含在新增论文内。

最近完成检查:2026-11-18 04:28最近发现新增版本:2026-11-17 23:35库内论文最新更新时间:2026-11-17 02:59

每分钟刷新已保存的数据。空检查不代表采集异常;新收录可能包含历史论文。AI 导读按新增版本计数。

25,786 已收录论文21,491 AI 相关7,725 有修订112 HF 社区发现

浏览论文库

时间范围跟随排序:版本更新、本站收录或首次发表。最新收录可能包含历史论文。部分信源异常,查看状态 →

找到 1 篇论文 · 按版本更新时间排序上轮扫描起点 2026-11-18 04:27(北京时间)
新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.18126

Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs

Christian Werling, Matti Finder, Hans Niklas Jacob, Julian Prein, Niclas Kühnapfel, Jean-Pierre Seifert

原文摘要

Windows Hello is the primary authentication mechanism on over one billion Windows 11 devices, supporting PINs as short as four digits. Such low-entropy PINs are viable only because the TPM's anti-hammering protection mitigates brute-force attacks. Most modern x86 platforms rely on firmware TPMs (fTPMs) that persist their non-volatile (NV) state, including the lockout state, to SPI flash. On newer platforms, rollback prevention of this state is delegated to the flash chip via Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMCs), a JEDEC-standardized mechanism operating over a physically accessible bus. We present the first practical security analysis of RPMC in shipping x86 systems. Using low-cost interposer hardware, we identify multiple implementation flaws, two of which fundamentally undermine RPMC's security model: First, Winbond SPI flash - the leading NOR flash vendor with over 25% market share - leaks its HMAC key under voltage glitching, enabling arbitrary counter forgery. Second, AMD's NV controller does not verify RPMC increments, so an interposer can suppress them unnoticed. Moreover, AMD platforms without RPMC flash appear to lack NV rollback protection altogether: on two AMD desktops, reflashing an old image resets the fTPM's lockout counters. Both flaws enable rollbacks of the fTPM's NV state (AMD, Intel, or Pluton), including its lockout counters. We demonstrate this end-to-end on locked, encrypted hardware: our setup finds a 4-digit Windows Hello PIN in 40 hours instead of 69 days. A compromised PIN also grants access to device-bound keys and Hello-based enterprise SSO. The same primitive defeats BitLocker's TPM+PIN pre-boot protector, reducing the worst-case time for a default-length 6-digit PIN from 19 years to 20 days.

cs.CR