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arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-21 12:19 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-21 12:19各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2609.06490

OracleZoom: Reference-Constrained Recursive Image Super-Resolution Beyond Ground Truth

Shubhashis Roy Dipta, Nobin Sarwar, Md Rizwan Parvez

原文摘要

Recursive image Super-Resolution (SR) reaches extreme magnification by feeding each prediction back into the same model, like zooming into an image again and again. Real ground truth for deep zooms is impractical to capture (a full $256\times$ target would be a 52 GB image), so predictions at deeper zooms have no supervision. Yet the last ground-truth image still contains the region that every deeper zoom magnifies. OracleZoom turns this region into a training signal. Inspired by on-policy self-distillation, the model trains on its own prediction for one recursive step ($4\times \rightarrow 16\times$), and a cross-scale loss projects each $16\times$ prediction back to the last ground truth at $4\times$. This projection can verify only coarse content, so a no-reference quality objective guides the remaining fine detail, and a latent prior stops this objective from adding hallucinated artifacts. On seven datasets, OracleZoom achieves the highest CLIPIQA at every zoom depth (mean 0.713 vs. 0.621 for Chain-of-Zoom), with the largest gains at the deepest zooms, even though training stops at $16\times$ and optimizes a different quality metric. Pooled over two ground-truth-anchored judges, this added detail comes at the same hallucination rate as Chain-of-Zoom at $16\times$ and a lower rate at $4\times$, and removing the cross-scale loss raises hallucination at $16\times$.

cs.CV · cs.AI · cs.CL · cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.03222

CERBO: Certified Recourse at a Requested Rate for Gradient-Boosted Trees

Farhan Shahriyar Hossain, Taufikur Rahman Fuad, Md. Zarif Bin Hasnat, Md Abrar Jahin, Md Rizwan Parvez

原文摘要

Recourse-aware learning trains models so that people who receive an adverse decision can reverse it with an affordable change. For gradient-boosted decision trees (GBDTs), the existing method, RABIT, exposes a single recourse weight whose effect on the recourse rate is abrupt and data-dependent, and its training bound cannot certify recourse for any rejected individual. We present Certified Recourse Boosting (CERBO), which takes a requested recourse rate and returns a GBDT with certified actions: it tracks exact additive effort along tree paths, trains against committed boxes (a family of bounds that contains RABIT's and certifies a within-budget action for each training sample) and adjusts the weight after every tree until the certified rate meets the request. A calibration step guarantees the rate on new individuals, and the certifier runs on any tree ensemble, including XGBoost and LightGBM, in milliseconds per person without a solver. In RABIT's own experimental protocol, at equal accuracy, CERBO raises the recourse ratio from 0.90 to 0.99 on FICO and from 0.64 to 0.77 on Bail. Under additive costs on six data sets, it raises the area under the accuracy-recourse frontier in all 12 settings, and in simulated deployments it guarantees recourse to 70% of rejected individuals in 11 of 12 settings, against 2 for RABIT.

cs.LG · cs.AI · cs.CY

版本更新 · v4arXiv:2510.06445

A Survey on Agentic Security: Applications, Threats and Defenses

Asif Shahriar, Md Nafiu Rahman, Sadif Ahmed, Farig Sadeque, Md Rizwan Parvez

原文摘要

In this work we present the first holistic survey of the agentic security landscape, structuring the field around the fundamental pillars of Applications, Threats and Defenses. We provide a comprehensive taxonomy of 274 papers that covers red-teaming, blue-teaming and domain-specific applications, attack surfaces on agentic systems, defense techniques, and both offensive and defensive evaluation frameworks. For each pillar, we first discuss the literature around the taxonomy and then perform a quantitative analysis to understand the patterns across these works. For the applications, we show their security-lifecycle coverage map, compare between red-teaming and blue-teaming agents, and analyze the adversarial use of red-teaming applications. On the threat side, we analyze the entry points and agent-loop stages that attacks target, their specificity to the agentic setting, and the threat models they assume. On the defense side, we analyze the prevailing defense strategies, their cost and security trade-offs, and where in the agent lifecycle they are deployed. Finally, we provide a deatiled cross-cutting analysis, where we map which defenses cover which attack classes and chart trends in agent architecture, backbone model usage, and data modality coverage. Taken together, these findings give a researcher a structural understanding of how agentic capabilities, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures relate to one another, and to identify where the field is concentrated and where it is thin.

cs.CL · cs.AI · cs.CR