跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail

论文库

检索计算机领域论文,按研究方向、作者或关键词筛选。

部分采集异常
正在读取账号与研究记录…

全站更新概况

+0新增论文
+0其中 AI 相关
+0已有论文修订
+91新增 AI 导读

arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-22 08:44 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-21 12:19各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

统计 2026-11-21 12:27 — 2026-11-22 12:27(北京时间) · 点击数字查看对应简报;AI 相关包含在新增论文内。

最近完成检查:2026-11-22 08:44最近发现新增版本:2026-11-21 12:19库内论文最新更新时间:2026-11-20 02:59

每分钟刷新已保存的数据。空检查不代表采集异常;新收录可能包含历史论文。AI 导读按新增版本计数。

29,158 已收录论文24,181 AI 相关8,992 有修订112 HF 社区发现

浏览论文库

时间范围跟随排序:版本更新、本站收录或首次发表。最新收录可能包含历史论文。部分信源异常,查看状态 →

找到 1 篇论文 · 按版本更新时间排序上轮扫描起点 2026-11-22 08:42(北京时间)
新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.25988

Sequential Contract Design for Budgeted Crowdsourcing

Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Shaul Rosner, Inbal Talgam-Cohen

原文摘要

A principal wishes to crowdsource a collection of tasks under a fixed compensation budget. The quality of a task's outcome is stochastic and depends on the worker's effort level. Since this effort is unobservable, the principal offers contracts to workers specifying their compensation for each possible outcome. The principal offers these contracts sequentially, using previously observed outcomes and payments to decide whom to approach next and what contract to offer. The objective is to maximize the expected value of the work produced while ensuring that total payments never exceed the budget, regardless of the realized outcomes. Contract design must therefore account both for a worker's incentives and for the budget available to incentivize others. For valuations that are additive across tasks, we characterize how the approximability of the optimal adaptive policy depends on the numbers of workers, effort levels, and outcomes. Polynomial-time constant-factor approximation is possible whenever the number of workers, effort levels per worker, or outcomes per task is constant, but impossible in general when all three are unrestricted, unless $P=NP$. We obtain tight guarantees for every fixed number of workers, establish computational hardness even in restricted settings, and obtain exact algorithms and approximation schemes in more structured settings. We also investigate simple contract structures, demonstrating both the benefits of adapting contracts to previous outcomes and the limitations of local contract rules, while identifying conditions under which a local policy achieves a constant-factor guarantee. Finally, we extend our analysis beyond additive valuations, obtaining constant-factor approximations for monotone submodular valuations with binary outcomes, including guarantees against a stronger full-knowledge benchmark under additional assumptions.

cs.GT