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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.16388

Strategically Robust Multi-Agent Control

Boris Velasevic, Nicolas Lanzetti, Eric Mazumdar

原文摘要

A key source of uncertainty in multi-agent systems is the behavior of other agents. Game-theoretic control approaches ignore this uncertainty, while robust control approaches treat others as fully adversarial. In this paper, we introduce strategically robust multi-agent control to populate the spectrum between these two paradigms. Specifically, in dynamic games, we propose that players are strategically robust and seek protection against misspecified control policies of the other players. This formulation induces a novel equilibrium concept, strategically robust dynamic equilibrium, that interpolates between game-theoretic control and robust control. We study this concept across canonical open- and closed-loop settings and show that accounting for strategic robustness also has computational benefits over classic approaches in game-theoretic control. Numerical experiments on vehicle platooning, inventory management, and network control illustrate resilience to misspecification, and also exhibit a "free-lunch" phenomenon in which strategic robustness can improve performance or social welfare.

math.OC · cs.GT · eess.SY

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2604.22318

Strategically Robust Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games

Boris Velasevic, Nicolas Lanzetti, Eric Mazumdar

原文摘要

We study linear quadratic dynamic games where players are uncertain about each other's control policies or goals and consequently seek to be strategically robust. Building on recent work on strategically robust and risk-averse game theory, we first formalize the problem of strategically robust linear quadratic dynamic games. We show that these can be rewritten as simple transformations of linear quadratic games in which each player chooses a controller in a fictitious game in which they are faced with an adversary who is penalized for deviating from the other players' policies. This formulation naturally induces a novel notion of dynamic equilibrium, which we call a strategically robust dynamic equilibrium. We establish existence and uniqueness (in the subgame-perfect sense) of such equilibria and show that the equilibrium policies are Markovian, linear, and can be efficiently computed via coupled backward Riccati equations. Through numerical simulations, including experiments in a network game, we illustrate the benefits of strategic robustness in designing robust and resilient decentralized control schemes. Our experiments also expose a "free-lunch" phenomenon in games in which robustness does not incur a corresponding loss in performance but can yield improvements in players' utilities and social welfare.

math.OC · cs.GT · eess.SY

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.09644

A Separation Principle for Cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Lucia Pezzetti, Nicolas Lanzetti, Antonio Terpin, Florian Dörfler, Giorgia Ramponi

原文摘要

We study cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) problems in which agents evolve under decoupled noisy dynamics but share a population objective. A canonical example is a mobility operator that orchestrates a fleet of vehicles to meet customer demand. The stochastic and time-varying nature of these problems calls for learning approaches, yet existing MARL algorithms do not scale: learning assignment and routing jointly over the full state-action space becomes prohibitive as the number of agents grows. Formulating the problem over the space of probability measures, we prove a separation principle: the population cost-to-go function is upper bounded by an optimal transport problem whose transportation cost is the target-conditioned single-agent cost-to-go function. This simplifies the multi-agent problem to learning a single-agent policy and coordinating the agents via optimal transport. Building on this principle, we introduce SALT (Separation-based Assignment and Learning via optimal Transport), a family of algorithms that learn a target-conditioned single-agent policy using any standard reinforcement learning algorithm, and then coordinate the agents via optimal transport. Since learning occurs at the single-agent level, SALT scales to fleet sizes where MARL baselines become intractable and transfers without retraining to fleet sizes unseen during training. In a vehicle-delivery experiment on the southern Manhattan road network, where MARL baselines are computationally prohibitive, SALT improves travel time by 15-21% over a shortest-path routing heuristic. In stochastic grid worlds, SALT reduces average travel times by 23-61% relative to MARL baselines and scales to population sizes where these methods fail.

cs.MA