Amr Elshazly, Jesse Roberts, Rachad Atat, Muhammad Ismail
原文摘要
Identifying high-impact attack paths in cyber-physical power systems is critical for improving grid resilience. Existing methods typically rely on either structural topology analysis or simulation-based cascading-failure models. Topology-based approaches capture connectivity but lack adversarial reasoning, while simulation-driven methods are primarily suited for offline analysis and are less effective for rapid evaluation of evolving attack scenarios. As a result, identifying realistic attack paths that jointly capture topology, threat semantics, and physical impact remains challenging. This paper presents a physics-grounded framework for identifying cyber-physical attack paths using large language models (LLMs), with cascading-failure-derived impact rankings used as physics-grounded references. The framework integrates system topology, LLM-guided STRIDE and MITRE ATT&CK threat modeling, and three baseline strategies for comparison: topology-driven, threat-driven, and fusion-based. Evaluation is performed using (i) critical-node overlap between LLM-inferred top-K rankings and cascading-failure-based ground truth; (ii) node-level similarity between LLM-inferred and reference paths; and (iii) path-level alignment capturing agreement in complete attack sequences. Results show that structured LLM-based threat modeling substantially improves alignment with physics-grounded references. In the cyber layer, critical-node overlap@3 increases from approximately 33% to as high as 100%, while node-level similarity reaches up to 65% and path-level alignment reaches up to 48%. In addition, the proposed framework reduces runtime by approximately 75--85% compared to the fusion-based baseline in the IEEE 14-bus system. These results suggest that LLM-guided attack path identification is a promising approach for efficient and impact-aware cyber-physical security analysis.
Md. Mainul Islam, Hasan Kurban, Abdulrahman Takiddin, Muhammad Ismail, Rachad Atat, Erchin Serpedin
原文摘要
False data injection (FDI) attacks can distort power system state estimation while retaining plausible measurement patterns. Existing FDI methods trade stealth for impact or vice versa. They often assume access to internal grids, all-bus sensing, or defender models. In this paper, we propose a detector-agnostic physics-constrained generative adversarial network (PCGAN) that learns decoupled power-flow sensitivities from historical measurements of deployed sensors. The learned active-power-angle and reactive-power-voltage-magnitude relationships guide perturbations restricted to compromised channels, while adversarial training promotes realistic spatiotemporal patterns. We implement PCGAN and seven existing FDI attacks on the IEEE 300-bus system using one year of observed hourly demand from PJM Interconnection, a regional transmission organization in the United States, and synthetic bus-level load profiles. We compare their performance across 10%, 30%, 60%, and 100% compromised sensors. Attack stealth is assessed against ten machine-learning (ML) detectors and conventional bad-data detection (BDD) methods, while physical impact is quantified through nonlinear alternating-current weighted least-squares state estimation. PCGAN achieves 84.28% mean ML evasion and 22.31% mean spatial load misperception across the four scenarios. Its mean stealth-impact trade-off score reaches 18.69%, compared with 5.61% for the strongest competing attack. PCGAN also achieves 83.45% chi-square BDD evasion and 86.02% largest-normalized-residual BDD evasion. These results demonstrate a favorable stealth-impact balance under varying sensor-access levels and provide challenging attack cases for evaluating FDI detectors.