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arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-23 01:07 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-21 12:19各信源进度 →

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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2609.17488

LimiX-2: A Contextual Mechanism Network Towards General Structured-Data Intelligence

Xingxuan Zhang, Gang Ren, Hao Yuan, Hao Zou, Hongze Tan, Hui Wang, Jianhao Song, Jiansheng Li 等 60 位作者

原文摘要

We introduce LimiX-2, a new model in the LimiX family, developed through model and data scaling guided by our previously established scaling laws. LimiX-2 adopts the Contextual Mechanism Networks (CMNs) paradigm and is pretrained with Context-Conditional Masked Modeling (CCMM). CMNs shifts the organizing principle of in-context learning from target-centric prediction to mechanism-oriented joint modeling. Rather than centering the network on the $p(y \mid x, D_{\mathrm{context}})$ objective of conventional tabular PFNs, it is designed around learning $p(x, y \mid D_{\mathrm{context}})$, a context-dependent representation of the joint structure underlying data generation. Pretraining uses synthetic datasets generated by structural causal models (SCMs) spanning diverse graph structures, functional mechanisms, and observation processes. Evaluations on TabArena, TALENT, and BCCO show that LimiX-2 outperforms current dataset-specific models and tabular foundation models. Beyond predictive performance, the CMN paradigm also promotes causal awareness in LimiX-2: its feature attention encodes direct causal relationships, enabling accurate causal skeleton recovery.

cs.AI

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.14489

多维市场中的次优交易具有一半效率

Second-Best Trade Is Half Efficient in Multidimensional Markets

Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Kangning Wang, Jinzhao Wu, Renzhe Xu

AI 速读 基于摘要

作者证明在多维双边市场中,总能通过满足贝叶斯激励相容、临时个体理性和强预算平衡的机制,实现至少一半的最优交易收益。

cs.GT

查看原文摘要

We prove that at least half of the first-best gains from trade can always be achieved in multidimensional two-sided markets with additive values and costs and arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraints. The guarantee is achieved by a mechanism satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility, interim individual rationality, and strong budget balance, and is tight already in single-item bilateral trade. Types are independent across agents, while the coordinates of each agent's type may be arbitrarily correlated. Feasibility constraints may couple trades across items and agents. This extends the known tight one-half guarantee for single-item bilateral trade. Our proof develops a new application of the Cai--Devanur--Weinberg duality framework. We show that the objective of every feasible dual is at least half of the first best. Strong duality then yields the guarantee without characterizing an optimal mechanism or dual. The key observation is that every feasible dual induces continuous-time Markov chains that, when stopped by exponential clocks, recover true types as expectations of virtual types. The dual constraints control the rate at which these chains change the prior distributions. We establish our bound by combining this control with a coupling of the agents' clocks.

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.11786

Payoff-Aware Prediction of Population Game Dynamics

Kang Wang, Xiao Wang, Bo Li, Renzhe Xu

原文摘要

Population game dynamics describe how aggregate behavior evolves in response to payoff signals. In many applications, the payoff function may change, and the goal is to predict the population trajectory induced by a new payoff design before trajectory data under that design are available. We study this problem as $\textbf{payoff-aware prediction of population game dynamics}$. Standard dynamics learning methods fit the motion observed under training payoffs, but do not separate the payoff-dependent incentive from the payoff-independent response structure needed for prediction under new payoffs. Building on the existing framework of Riemannian game dynamics, we propose PA-RmD, a payoff-aware learning method that keeps payoff information explicit and learns the payoff-independent response structure from data. Theoretically, we show that the learned model preserves fixed-payoff Nash equilibria and derive finite-time one-step prediction bounds under shared-response and payoff-coverage conditions. Empirically, we evaluate PA-RmD on synthetic zero-sum and potential games, as well as a YouTube Trending multi-country dataset, showing that our method performs well under changing payoff designs.

cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.02845

Persuasion by Parts

Shuyuan Jia, Kangning Wang, Renzhe Xu

原文摘要

Classical Bayesian persuasion assumes that an information designer can condition signals on the entire state. We propose persuasion by parts. In this model, the receiver's payoff from acting is $X = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$ for independent coordinates $X_1,\ldots,X_n$ observed by separate sources. The designer commits in advance to a product experiment, in which each source $i$ can condition its signal only on $X_i$. Given the signals, the receiver computes her posterior mean $y$ of $X$ and acts with probability $g(y)$, where $g\colon \mathbb{R} \to [0,1]$ is a nondecreasing function. The designer aims to maximize the probability of action. Let $V_{\mathrm{prod}}(g)$ and $V_{\mathrm{joint}}(g)$ be the supremum probabilities of action under persuasion by parts and under joint persuasion, respectively. When the designer knows $g$, we show $$ V_{\mathrm{prod}}(g) \;\ge\; c\,V_{\mathrm{joint}}(g)^2 \qquad\text{for every nondecreasing } g\colon \mathbb{R} \to [0,1], $$ where $c > 0$ is an absolute constant independent of $n$ and the prior; the exponent $2$ is tight. When $g$ is unknown, we construct a product experiment $Π$ from the prior alone, whose probability of action $V_Π(g)$ satisfies $$ V_Π(g) \;\ge\; c_\varepsilon\,V_{\mathrm{joint}}(g)^{2 + \varepsilon} \qquad\text{for every } \varepsilon > 0 \text{ and every nondecreasing } g\colon \mathbb{R} \to [0,1], $$ where $c_\varepsilon > 0$ depends only on $\varepsilon$.

cs.GT · econ.TH

版本更新 · v4arXiv:2403.15524

PPA-Game: Characterizing and Learning Competitive Dynamics Among Online Content Creators

Renzhe Xu, Haotian Wang, Xingxuan Zhang, Bo Li, Peng Cui

原文摘要

In this paper, we present the Proportional Payoff Allocation Game (PPA-Game), which characterizes situations where agents compete for divisible resources. In the PPA-game, agents select from available resources, and their payoffs are proportionately determined based on heterogeneous weights attributed to them. Such dynamics simulate content creators on online recommender systems like YouTube and TikTok, who compete for finite consumer attention, with content exposure reliant on inherent and distinct quality. We first conduct a game-theoretical analysis of the PPA-Game. While the PPA-Game does not always guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), we identify prevalent scenarios ensuring its existence. Simulated experiments further prove that the cases where PNE does not exist rarely happen. Beyond analyzing static payoffs, we further discuss the agents' online learning about resource payoffs by integrating a multi-player multi-armed bandit framework. We propose an online algorithm facilitating each agent's maximization of cumulative payoffs over $T$ rounds. Theoretically, we establish that the regret of any agent is bounded by $O(\log^{1 + η} T)$ for any $η> 0$. Empirical results further validate the effectiveness of our online learning approach.

cs.GT · cs.LG