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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.09446

Logit Laundering: Evading Data-Use Auditing in Large Language Models

Ruihan Hu, Wei Luo, Yu-Ming Shang, Jiakai Wang, Chuxuan Zhang, Mei Li, Xi Zhang, Meikang Qiu

原文摘要

Data-use auditing in Large Language Models (LLMs) aims to determine whether the given data has been used for training, thereby supporting data ownership safeguards. A dominant solution is data watermarking, which embeds traceable signals into training data and detects them in model outputs. Recent studies have proposed many watermarking-based auditing methods in LLMs. However, systematic investigation from an adversarial perspective remains limited: non-compliant LLM providers would use unauthorized copyrighted datasets for training their own models to enhance model capabilities, while attempting to evade detection by auditors, thereby avoiding legal liability. To fill this research gap, we propose a novel evasion framework, termed Logit Laundering, where the non-compliant LLM provider manipulates model outputs at inference time to undermine detectable watermark signals. Specifically, we design a logit reshaping module to suppress watermark-induced statistical signals by integrating a statistical bias estimator as a plug-and-play component. This design keeps the model parameters unchanged and performs manipulation only in the logit space, thereby enabling auditing evasion while minimizing the impact on model's learned knowledge. To further balance evasion effectiveness and model utility, we introduce a confidence-aware scaling module to adaptively calibrate the suppression strength based on next-token prediction confidence. Extensive evaluations show that Logit Laundering can successfully evade existing various state-of-the-art auditing methods, significantly attenuating detectable signals, while preserving model utility on downstream tasks. Our work highlights the need for exploring more robust auditing methods to guard against evasion behaviors.

cs.CR · cs.AI

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.38209

Is it my preference? Role Grounding Attack against Agent's Memory via Social Interaction

Haoran Bu, Yiting Shen, Litian Zhang, Ruihan Hu, Xi Zhang

原文摘要

LLM-based agents now share experiences on social platforms and remember new preferences to enhance their performance. However, existing memory systems contain a vulnerability in role-to-principal attribution that attackers can exploit. We identify Role Grounding Misattribution, in which an attacker-designed interaction causes the victim agent to incorrectly record a preference from the attacker as a preference of the victim's user. Specifically, we are the first to formalize Role Grounding Attack (RGA), an attack model that exploits this vulnerability through nested conversation structures. In the memory formation stage, an experience-sharing post quoting a conversation between the attacker agent and its user is published, which explicitly identifies its publisher. The inner conversation expresses preferences from the user of the attacker agent. When the victim agent remembers preferences from this nested structure, its memory loses the context binding and grounds the attacker's preference to the victim's user instead. In the memory retrieval stage, the misattributed preference persists and influences the victim agent's decisions when it encounters relevant scenarios. We instantiate RGA as tool selection manipulation and privacy leakage. Tool selection manipulation causes a tool-call preference to be misattributed to the victim's user, steering the victim toward an attacker-controlled tool. Privacy leakage extends this by misattributing both a tool-call preference and a task-requirement preference to the victim's user. The victim selects the attacker's tool, then includes sensitive information in tool arguments to satisfy the task requirement. We evaluate RGA across five mainstream memory systems and six language models. Tool manipulation and privacy leakage both achieve high attack success rates. These results call for stronger role grounding.

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.MA